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Chapter 1
Introduction
This work deals with the economic impact of regulations on the German film
industry, focusing in particular on the effects of three pieces of legislation.1
They are central to Germany’s public debate on film politics and comprise:
 the Film Act (Filmförderungsgesetz - FFG), which governs subsidies of
the German film industry at a federal level,
 recent changes in the Copyright Law (Urheberrechtsgesetz - GCL) gov-
erning the relationship between copyright owners and their contractual
counterparts, and
 the Inter-State Agreement on Broadcasting (Rundfunkstaatsvertrag -
RStV), which bans the use of product placements as a means of film
financing.
A notable feature of these statutes is that they grant exemptions to spe-
cific addressees, e.g., film producers and copyright owners, rather than pro-
mote level playing fields or standards of fair dealing as in competition law. It
thus seems reasonable to ask what tangible benefits, if any, these exemptions
confer on society.
We approach this question from an economic perspective, focusing on how
these regulations influence economic efficiency. The analysis is supplemented
with an overview of market and institutional characteristics of the German
film industry.
In addition to a general opportunity to study regulatory effects, the Ger-
man film industry offers three additional merits that make it an attractive
1The terms “motion picture,” “film,” and “movie” are used synonymously here.
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subject of economic research. First, the industry’s economic significance has
grown over the two past decades. With respect to television fiction, the
industry has witnessed an explosion of demand with the advent of private
broadcasters in the mid-1980s. More recently, revenues in the German the-
atrical market rose from ¿ 605.10 million in 1995 to ¿ 987.20 million in
2001 – an average annual growth rate of about 8.5%.2 Second, as part of
the entertainment industry, its products and members generate considerable
public interest. Few trade fairs receive as much attention as the Berlinale
and few heads of major industrial firms are as well known as popular actors.
Third, the lack of economic research on the film industry is surprising. This
holds especially with respect to the German motion picture industry.3
The work is structured around three main chapters. Each chapter ad-
dresses one of the areas of regulation noted above.
Chapter 2 addresses the subsidization of movie production under the
German Film Act. The chapter discusses different mechanisms of subsidy al-
location invoked by operation of law. We compare the allocation of subsidies
via committees to the allocation of subsidies through the reference principle,
which binds public support to performance at the box office. The analysis
is embedded in a broadly disposed regression analysis of the determinants
of the performance of German movies in the theatrical market. It aims to
identify market characteristics and contrasts the German case with studies
that address foreign markets. Finally, the profitability of the industry is con-
sidered as the presumed economic non-viability of the industry constantly
recurs in the public debate as an argument for subsidies.
Chapter 3 investigates the economic effects imposed on the industry by
recent amendments to the Copyright Law, which governs the relationship be-
tween copyright owners (e.g., directors) and their contractual counterparts
(e.g., producers). The changes assume the existence of a prevailing “struc-
tural superiority” of media companies over their contractual partners in labor
markets which supposedly results in “unfair” contracts. Basically, the law
establishes two mechanisms to contain the supposed injustice. It fosters col-
lective remuneration schemes and prescribes legal claims for “appropriate”
compensation, which includes a de facto prescription of the utilization of
sharing contracts. Chapter 3 provides an economic approach to the mat-
ter. First, it considers potential effects and the plausibility of a “structural
superiority” in terms of buyer power in the German film industry. Second,
2Source: Business Reports of the Filmförderungsanstalt (German Federal Film Board
- FFA).
3The study by Frank (1993) is a notable exception. Economic literature on the US
motion picture industry is referred to throughout the following discussion.
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it analyzes the effects of collective remuneration schemes with the help of
standard models of union behavior and considers how the law affects risk
allocation, incentives, transaction costs, and legal certainty in the business.
Chapter 4 addresses the economic impact of advertising regulations in the
industry. The digital convergence of media provides a starting point for the
analysis. This convergence makes technically feasible “interactive product
placement” (IPP), the integration of interactively purchasable products in
television programs and movies for the purpose of advertising. Such adver-
tising could conceivably outstrip traditional product placement as a source of
revenues for the film industry. Moreover, IPP could provide valuable incen-
tives to create new audiovisual hardware and software. As product placement
is generally banned in Germany, we infer that IPP may also be banned. Thus,
Chapter 4 identifies German advertising regulations that potentially apply
to IPP and considers their reasoning. These regulations are then critically
reviewed, and a simple model is developed that allows for a welfare economic
approach to the analysis of an IPP ban.
Chapter 5 summarizes the results and provides concluding comments.
Chapter 2
The Performance of German
Motion Pictures, Profits, and
Subsidies: Empirical Evidence
from the ’90s
2.1 Introduction
This chapter pursues three objectives. First, against the background of heavy
subsidization of the German film industry, it analyzes the effects of two types
of subsidy allocation: committee allocation and reference principle allocation.
Second, it seeks to identify the determinants of performance of German mo-
tion pictures. Third, the profitability of the industry is considered as the
presumed economic non-viability of the industry constantly recurs in the
public debate as an argument for subsidies.
A number of econometric studies examine the performance of motion pic-
tures, e.g., Litman and Ahn (1998), Mulligan and Motiere (1994), Prag and
Casavant (1994), Sochay (1994), Wyatt (1991), and Smith and Smith (1986).
Generally, these studies apply the OLS regression technique and estimate a
film’s success on the basis of box office receipts. The independent variables in
the regression equations typically consist of variables such as budget, genre,
reviews, stars, directors, awards, age restrictions, and distributors’ size. Al-
though these estimates are based on different data and regression specifica-
tions, the results reveal certain parallels. Broadly speaking, they suggest a
positive relation between a film’s performance and its budget, its reviews,
and star drawing power.
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The recent contributions of De Vany and Walls (1999), Ravid (1999)
and Bagella and Becchetti (1999) extend previous studies in several ways.
De Vany and Walls (1999) and Bagella and Becchetti (1999) note that distri-
butions of box office receipts are heavily skewed by the few blockbuster films
that generate a large chunk of the industry’s total revenues. Finding that
the general OLS normality assumption is violated for their data, they em-
ploy sophisticated estimation techniques in order to overcome methodological
problems.1
De Vany and Walls (1999) suggest that box office revenues are asymp-
totically Pareto-distributed, and analyze how the marginal probability of a
“hit” can be altered with respect to several variables. They demonstrate that
extending a film’s run and a wide release are the most important factors in
raising a film’s hit probability.2 Budget, stars, sequels, genre types, ratings,
and year of release also have significant influences.
De Vany and Walls (1999) further investigate the determinants of profits
in the movie business. This is clearly the crucial question from a financier’s
perspective. The related estimations exhibit a poor fit, indicating there is no
formula for generating profits in the motion picture industry. These results
are supported by Ravid (1999), who finds that only certain age ratings are
positively related to the rates of return on the movies in his sample.3 These
studies illustrate the widely reported “nobody knows” property in motion
picture production.4
Although most studies on motion picture performance focus on the North
American market, Bagella and Becchetti (1999) consider the Italian market.
Moreover, they investigate the effects of motion pictures subsidies and find
that the “net effect” of subsidies is unrelated to a film’s performance, al-
though subsidized movies perform, on average, more poorly than unsub-
sidized movies. They further investigate Rosen’s superstar phenomenon
1For a discussion on the consequences of nonnormality, see Judge et al. (1985), Chapter
20.
2Intuitively, of course, we would expect a “hit” with audiences is more likely to have
its run extended.
3De Vany and Walls (1999) define movie profits as: box office · 0.5 − budget. This mea-
sure includes revenues from the domestic theatrical market only. This probably strongly
underestimates actual profits, since movie revenues from the domestic market are only part
of total revenues. Ravid (1999) defines the rate of return simply as the relation of box
office receipts and a movie’s budget. This can be problematic as the business is typically
dominated by non-linear contracts.
4De Vany and Walls (1999) cite the famous remark of screenwriter W. Goldman (1983):
“With all due respect, nobody knows anything.” Similar statements can be found in Caves
(2000) and Litman (1998).
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(Rosen (1981)) by controlling for nonlinear effects of the ex ante popularity
of actors and directors on a film’s total admissions. They find their data is
“...broadly consistent with this conceptual framework.” (p. 251).
The present study (i) provides an empirical analysis of the performance
of German motion pictures in terms of admission numbers and in terms of
economic success, (ii) introduces independent variables that account for both
subsidies and different mechanisms of subsidy allocation, (iii) investigates the
feasibility of profits in the German movie industry, (iv) touches on relevant
public policy issues,5 and (v) considers superstar effects.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 briefly
summarizes the major features of German film funding, which is used as a
background for the analysis, and discusses implications of different subsidy
allocation mechanisms. Section 2.3 presents the regression analysis. Section
2.3.1 gives a summary of the data base and Section 2.3.2 illustrates the the-
oretical motivation for our demand model. Sections 2.3.3 and 2.3.4 analyze
movie performance in terms of admission numbers, overall rates of return,
producers’ rates of return, and distributors’ rates of return. Section 2.4 inves-
tigates the often-questioned feasibility of profitability in the German motion
picture business. Conclusions and policy recommendations are presented in
Section 2.5.
2.2 German Film Funding
2.2.1 Subsidy Allocation
The German film industry differs fundamentally from the US film industry
in that it serves a smaller domestic market, obtains heavy public funding,
and captures only a small domestic market share and a microscopic share of
the global market.6 Proponents of public subsidies argue that the German
market is too small to allow German film producers to survive economically.7
Every year, about 60 German films, most heavily subsidized, are premiered
5Rather than discuss the pros and cons of public subsidies in general, we focus specif-
ically on the effects of some features of funding arrangements. For discussion of public
promotion of the arts, see e.g., Pommerehne and Frey (1990) and Frey (2000).
6See Table A.2.1 in the appendix to this chapter for a brief description of the German
market. This study adheres to the definition of film origin as specified in §15 of the German
Film Act (FFG), whereby a German film is one which has a final German language version,
uses predominantly German studios, and has a production company registered in Germany.
7See Huber (2000).
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in German theatres. Of the 120 films released between 1993 and 1998 used in
this study, 105 were subsidized. Of these, subsidies covered on average more
than 55% of their production budgets.8 Total film funding exceeded ¿ 157
million in 1998. Financial support for the motion picture industry is mainly
provided by federal and state governments. Additional money is provided
by public and private TV stations both at the federal and state level, which
in turn usually get access to the TV rights for subsidized movies. About
60% of total funding is used to finance motion picture productions, while
the remaining 40% goes to different financing schemes such as film distri-
bution, vocational training, film event funding, and fostering international
co-productions. We concentrate our analysis on public support for film pro-
duction and distribution.
At the state level, funding committees are typically responsible for the
allocation of subsidies to individual motion pictures. Support is generally
provided in the form of a conditionally repayable interest-free loan, i.e., the
loan must only be paid back after the distribution costs (prints and advertis-
ing - P&A) and the producer’s own investment have been covered. Therefore,
subsidies from the committee principle provide some degree of insurance to
producers. Committees mainly consist of politically appointed representa-
tives and representatives from public and private TV stations.9 Therefore,
committee decisions are reached through negotiations and are likely to be
influenced by non-market factors. For instance, production companies are
often obliged to spend a certain share of the budget within the funding state
or to produce contents that somehow relate to that state. Furthermore, com-
mittees are likely to be subject to lobbying efforts by producers, directors,
and distributors.
In contrast, at the federal level, most subsidies are allocated according
to the reference film principle set forth in the German Film Act (FFG).10
The reference film principle states that the production company of a mo-
tion picture (the reference film) is entitled to receive non-repayable financial
support for a new feature if the reference film attracts 100,000 cinema ad-
8The actual fraction is probably higher, because in the case of international co-
productions, foreign subsidies are not considered due to data availability. Note that our
use of the term “subsidy” here refers to both non-repayable and conditionally repayable
financial support.
9The Intendantenmodell (director’s model) found in the states of Berlin/Brandenburg
is an exception to this rule. The managing director of the fund, the Filmboard Berlin
Brandenburg, is solely responsible for funding decisions.
10See § 68 Film Act. It is important to note that committee decisions on the allocation
of subsidies also occur at the federal level.
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missions within one year.11 The exact amount of the subsidy is computed
according to the number of admissions of the reference film.12 Hence, sub-
sidy allocation is closely tied to the reference film’s performance. In 1999,
the reference principle was extended to distribution.13 Unlike movie pro-
duction subsidies, distributors need only reach 50,000 admissions to qualify
for reference funding.14 Furthermore, the subsidy consists of a conditional
repayable and interest free loan, which means repayment starts only if the
costs of distribution (prints and advertising - P&A) have been covered.
2.2.2 Committee vs. Reference Principle
As far as we are aware, Bagella and Becchetti (1999) were the first to investi-
gate the effect of subsidies on movie performance in an econometric analysis.
They found that “...the net effect of subsidies on the mean of the dependent
variable is irrelevant.” (p. 246). We question whether this result holds for the
German case. Bagella and Becchetti (1999) investigate subsidies that only
consist of below-market interest rates, while our analysis confronts a different
situation. As stated above, subsidies account for over half of the average film
budget in Germany. Moreover, almost every film is subsidized. We suspect
that these subsidies must have a substantial impact on the production of
German movies.
The committee principle, in particular, is likely to influence producers’
behavior. Our reasoning starts with Kornai’s seminal work on the soft bud-
get constraint (see Kornai (1979), Kornai (1980)). Kornai (1986) defines the
softening of the budget constraint as follows: “The ‘softening’ of the budget
constraint results when the strict relationship between expenditure and earn-
ings has been relaxed, because excess expenditure over earnings will be paid
by some other institution, typically by the state.” (p. 4). A fundamental
attribute of such assistance is that “...it is negotiable, subject to bargaining,
lobbying, etc.” (p. 5). This well describes how subsidies are allocated by
committees. Committee subsidies weaken the relation between expenditure
11These viewer numbers drop to 50,000 if the reference film receives a certificate from the
Filmbewertungsstelle Wiesbaden (FBW) or if it wins a prize at a prominent film festival.
If the reference film is a documentary or a children’s feature, then the required viewer
numbers fall to 25,000 within a four-year period.
12A maximum of 1.2 million admissions are taken into account. If the total number of
viewers exceeds this level, it does not lead to higher subsidies under the reference principle.
13Compare § 53 FFG.
14Again, the required number of viewers drops to 25,000 when the reference film re-
ceives a certificate from the Filmbewertungsstelle Wiesbaden (FBW) or wins a prize at a
prominent film festival.
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and earnings and are subject to lobbying. With respect to dynamic effects
of the soft budget constraint, Kornai (1986) states:
“If the budget constraint is hard, the firm has no other option but
to adjust to unfavorable external circumstances by improving qual-
ity, cutting costs, introducing new products or new processes, i.e., it
must behave in an entrepreneurial manner. If, however, the budget
constraint is soft, such productive efforts are no longer imperative.”
(p. 10).
Applied to our case, this implies that committee subsidized production
companies may work either inefficiently, irrespective of market needs, or both.
Moreover, such effects are likely to be reinforced for cultural reasons. Ger-
many has a long tradition of cinema as an elite art form rather than mass
entertainment.15 Thus, it is plausible to presume that some German produc-
ers will pursue objectives other than gross at the box office. Their cultural
commitments may lead them to sacrifice financial prudence for their own
preferences for film quality.16 One further reason for producing irrespective
of market needs is that committees themselves may pursue other priorities
than satisfying the audience, e.g., local employment effects from movie sub-
sidization, fitting a project to a TV station’s profile, and the professional or
personal preferences of committee members.
In summary, our hypothesis is that subsidies allocated through commit-
tees may support films that are unlikely to satisfy demand, because produc-
tion companies have no motivation to behave in an entrepreneurial manner
and because committees can ignore market needs. Therefore, the committee
principle seems likely to entail negative effects on the performance of the
German motion picture industry.
The reference principle seems a priori a more appropriate mechanism for
movie subsidization as it binds public support to the firm’s previous market
performance. Thus, it provides incentives to produce for the audience and
may help reduce the total amount of film funding needed per viewer.
However, some conditions have to be met to make the latter benefits
possible. First, production companies that gain support from the reference
principle must consistently produce movies that enjoy above-average success.
Otherwise, it would not matter if the reference subsidies flow to previously
15See e.g., Jarothe (1997), p. 49.
16See Rose-Ackerman (1987) for a theoretical treatment of a similar argument. Caves
(2000) assumes that creative workers care about their products using the same line of
argument.
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successful or to previously unsuccessful production companies.17 Second,
a film’s success should be defined in terms of economic success, i.e., in its
rate of return. Otherwise inefficiently high budgets, financed by committee
subsidies, could be rewarded with reference subsidies.18 Third, and most im-
portant, we should consider that subsidies only make sense where subsidized
movies cannot cover their cost in the marketplace, i.e., they are not-for-profit
productions. Therefore, it is important to examine whether these conditions
are actually met.
2.3 Regression Analysis
2.3.1 Data Base
The analysis includes 120 of 367 German feature films released between 1993
and 1998. Incomplete budget data forced a limiting of the data set. We do
not expect a sample selection bias, however, as we see no incentives that could
systematically bias decisions with respect to the publication of production
budgets. Most previous econometric studies on the determinants of motion
picture success only consider successful films. For instance, Sochay’s (1994)
study is based on Variety magazine’s list of top rental films. Our study, in
contrast, also uses data from films with very weak attendance. Data on such
German films is readily accessible, because the FFG dictates publication of all
viewer numbers of funded films. Further, the relatively small German market
facilitates data research as the domestic professional journals give more space
to unsuccessful films. The data has been gathered from a number of sources:
the periodical reports of the Filmförderungsanstalt (German Federal Film
Board - FFA), the film journals Blickpunkt:Filmand Filmecho/Filmwoche,
the Lexikon des internationalen Films (International Film Dictionary), the
Filmbewertungsstelle Wiesbaden (Film Evaluation Board - FBW), the Inter-
net Movie Data Base, and the Spitzenorganisation der Filmwirtschaft (Head
Organization of the German Film Industry - SPIO).19 All Euro (Deutsche
Mark) amounts are adjusted to 1993 by deflating them with the cost of living
index of private households.
17It is worth to remember that this condition might not be met too easily. Consider
that the statement of screenwriter Goldman (1983):“With all due respect, nobody knows
anything.” became the motto of De Vany and Walls (1999).
18This may in fact be the case under the current per-viewer specification of the reference
principle in § 22 FFG.
19The author thanks Mr. Carsten Pfaff from the SPIO department of statistics for
contributing data on production budgets.
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Figure 2.1 indicates admissions of German movies follow the typical block-
buster pattern, with a few movies drawing enormous audiences, and the rest
experiencing modest or poor attendance.20
A
D
M
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S

Rank
1 120
671
6.6e+06
Figure 2.1: Blockbuster Property: Distribution of Admission Numbers of the
Movies in the Sample (Ordered by Rank)
The differences between the movies, in terms of audience appeal, is re-
markable. The best movie performs more than 9700 times better than the
worst! Table 2.1 gives some more information about the distribution of ad-
missions, budgets, and subsidies of the movies in the sample.
We can see that the distribution of budgets is also relatively uneven.
Moreover, concerning the distribution of subsidies from different allocation
mechanisms, we find that reference subsidies are far more skewed than com-
mittee subsidies. This may be explained by the fact that reference subsidies
are allocated according to the variable market performance of the reference
film.
20For an early analysis of the economics of blockbusters, see Garvin (1981). The most
recent German blockbuster was Der Schuh des Manitu.
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Admissions Budgets Subsidies
Reference Committee
Average 509,002 3,684,655 544,754 1,482,569
Std. dev. 1,014,957 4,342,604 587,635 1,017,526
Maximum 6,565,342 24,877,418 3,464,844 5,879,857
Minimum 671 146,741 9,003 21,726
1% percentile 1,161 193,780 9,003 44,077
5% percentile 2,941 454,027 33,170 174,248
10% percentile 4,568 620,453 45,803 398,280
25% percentile 15,989 1,419,346 105,735 740,695
Median 77,307 2,176,058 401,831 1,371,191
75% percentile 495,076 3,901,157 749,642 1,956,793
90% percentile 1,456,680 8,743,091 1,206,931 2,725,911
95% percentile 2,622,281 11,964,230 1,439,287 3,621,047
99% percentile 4,951,385 20,451,675 3,464,844 4,154,549
n 120 120 51 104
Table 2.1: Admissions, Budgets (in Euro), and Subsidies (in Euro) of the
120 Movies in the Sample
2.3.2 Demand Specification
We apply a log-linear model of demand that ensures a broad description of
the determinants of German motion picture performance. The specification
of our model is based on the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) model of monopolistic
competition, as specified by Hamlen (1991) and Hamlen (1994) in the context
of an empirical analysis of Rosen’s (1981) superstar phenomenon in the record
market. Within this framework, the demand for record sales displays a log-
linear relationship with a vector of general and quality attributes of the
records (Hamlen, 1991, p. 730; 1994, p. 398). We suggest that this model fits
the motion picture business as demand-side and supply-side characteristics
of music and movie markets have quite similar structures. On the demand
side, we observe that individuals prefer to consume a wide variety of music
and movies. Further, in both markets, we can reasonably assume imperfect
substitution of lesser quality for greater quality. On the supply side, we find
scale economies of joint consumption. As with Hamlen (1991), the log-linear
specification is also supported by the Box-Cox transformation technique,
which can be regarded as one approach to letting the data determine the most
appropriate functional form.21 Finally, the log-linear formulation allows us to
21Compare Judge, Griffiths, Carter Hill, Lütkepohl, and Lee (1985), p. 840.
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investigate Rosen’s (1981) superstar phenomenon, because it yields regression
coefficients that provide elasticities.
2.3.3 Absolute Performance
Regression (2.1) examines the determinants of German feature film perfor-
mance in terms of absolute admission numbers, which are represented by the
variable ADMISS.
ln ADMISS = α1+α2S-PROD+α3V S-PROD+α4COMM+α5COPR+ (2.1)
α6 ln ACTOR+α7DIRECTOR+α8 ln BUDGET+α9FBWHR+
α10FBWR+α11DRAMA+α12CHILD+α13CRIME+
α14ACTION+α15FSK0+α16FSK6+α17FSK12+
α18FSK16+α19MINIMAJOR+α20INDEPENDENT+ε1
The independent variables of regression (2.1) consist of a vector of general
and quality attributes that are supposed to affect a film’s performance.
With respect to the effects of subsidies, we define four binary dummies. To
capture the features of the reference film principle, we construct S-PROD for
successful production companies and VS-PROD for very successful produc-
tion companies. These variables distinguish whether a production company
was successful (100,000 admissions) or very successful (500,000 admissions)
according to the average admissions of films it produced between 1993 and
1998 that were not part of the sample (see Table A.2.2 in the appendix to this
chapter). Thus, if the reference film principle supports consistently successful
production companies, S-PROD and VS-PROD should be positively related
to a film’s performance. The dummy variable COMM is used to control for
the influence of committee types of funding. It reflects all motion pictures in
the sample that were subsidized with non-reference film funding. Since com-
mittee subsides are allocated to both successful and unsuccessful production
companies, we expect COMM not to be significantly linked to a film’s per-
formance. Subsidies for international co-productions are a widespread means
of film funding. The most compelling argument for supporting international
co-productions lies in the fact that it helps to solve financing problems for
movies with high budgets. The subsidization of international co-productions
is, however, often criticized. It is said that they have resulted in culturally
and economically unsuccessful “Europudding” films. We set up the dummy
variable COPRODUCTION to see if there is a relationship between interna-
2.3. Regression Analysis 14
tional co-productions and a picture’s performance with German audiences.
Hence, the variable COPRODUCTION is intended to provide clues regarding
the validity of the competing arguments.
Most previous studies on the movie business find that the appearance of
a star improves a film’s box-office gross. For instance, De Vany and Walls
(1999) and Albert (1998). Furthermore, Bagella and Becchetti (1999) find
that the ex ante popularity of actors entails nonlinear effects on a film’s to-
tal admissions. They interpret this result as empirical support in favor of
Rosen’s (1981) superstar hypothesis. However, following Hamlen (1994), we
argue that popularity is only a measure of previous success and, therefore,
no objective and external measure of quality. This implies that it might not
provide evidence for the superstar phenomenon in the sense described by
Rosen (1981), who argues that small differences in quality may lead to large
differences in earnings. We therefore suggest that the ex ante popularity of
an actor is rather a measure of the knowledge that consumers have about
a particular actor. Such an interpretation fits the model proposed by Adler
(1985), who argues that the superstar phenomenon exists because individual
utility increases with the individual knowledge about the work of a specific
artist. Since individual knowledge can be increased either by direct con-
sumption of the artist’s work or through discussion with other individuals,
the number of individuals that consume the work of the artist also affects the
individual utility. Thus, we prefer the interpretation of ex ante popularity
in Adler’s sense. To control for the effects of ex ante popularity of actors
in the German market, we define the index ACTOR (see Table A.2.3 in the
appendix to this chapter). The value of the index is 1, 2, 3, where the num-
ber of actors in the movie who previously had a leading role in a movie that
reached at least 400,000 admissions is 0, 1, 2 or more, respectively. If there
are superstar effects, the coefficient of this variable should thus be larger than
one. It is clear, however, that index construction is arbitrary by nature, so
related results should be considered with due caution.
We construct the binary dummy DIRECTOR to analyze the influence
that directors whose movies reached large audiences in the past have on
movie performance (see Table A.2.4 in the appendix to this chapter). We
would suggest DIRECTOR to be positively related to a film’s performance,
because previously successful directors are likely to be both talented, and
willing to meet demand, which is not necessarily the case for directors who
never succeed.22
A film’s budget is represented by the variable BUDGET. We expect the
22See Rother (1997) for a description of the director’s role in film production.
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budget of a film to have a positive effect on the film’s performance. This
assumption seems tenable as features with larger budgets tend to reach more
viewers. They have the resources to finance high quality inputs for technical
equipment and other “below the line” inputs, as well as to buy creative
“above the line” inputs such as screen writers, directors and actors (see e.g.,
Prag and Casavant (1994)).
In Germany, the Filmbewertungsstelle Wiesbaden (Film Evaluation Board
- FBW) appraises features and awards films it believes have content of
outstanding quality with the certificates “recommended” or “highly recom-
mended.” The FBW is a public institution and part of the German cultural
film policy: a certificate can improve the chances of receiving film funding
and, in some states, implies entertainment tax reductions. The certificates
are awarded by a committee with five members. In a formal procedure, each
movie is viewed at full length and an evaluation is carried out. We use FBW
certificates here as a proxy for critical appraisal. Accordingly, the dummies
FBWHR for highly recommended and FBWR for recommended films are
included in the analysis.
A film’s genre may also relate to a film’s success (see e.g., De Vany and
Walls (1999); Prag and Casavant (1994)). Accordingly, dummy variables
are defined and classified as set out in the Dictionary of International Film.
The classifications are DRAMA, CHILDREN, CRIME, and ACTION, with
COMEDY serving as the base category.23
Age restrictions may also influence the success of a movie (Ravid (1999);
Sochay (1994); Wyatt (1991)). These effects are, however, ambiguous. On
the one hand, age restrictions reduce the number of potential viewers. On
the other hand, they may signal specific contents of a film and can potentially
increase the number of viewers. In Germany, age restrictions are set by the
Freiwillige Selbstkontrolle (Organization for the Voluntary Self–Regulation
of the German Film Industry - FSK). The dummy variables FSK0, FSK6,
FSK12 and FSK16 reflect the respective age restrictions, while the FSK18
age restriction serves as the default.24
In the area of film distribution, three categories of film distributors’ size
23The category ACTION differs from the classification in the Dictionary of International
Film and comprises genres that are rarely produced in Germany (namely action, adventure,
war, and science fiction). CRIME consists of movies classified as criminal and thriller.
Those movies without information available in the Dictionary of International Film were
evaluated with the help of the Internet Movie Data Base (www.imdb.com) and the internet
database of Blickpunkt:Film (www.cinebiz.de).
24The FSK rating is similar to the voluntary Motion Picture Association of America
ratings.
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are considered (see Table A.2.5 in the appendix to this chapter). These are
INDEPENDENT, MINIMAJOR and MAJOR. The latter is used as the base
category in the regressions. The rationale for this distinction is that a distrib-
utor’s size is linked with a film’s marketing costs and a film’s potential market
size. For instance, independent distributors typically focus on niche markets,
so releases by independent distributors show low numbers of release prints.
This suggests that the number of admissions of an independently released film
should, on average, be lower. The same rationale applies, although probably
to a lower extent, to mini-majors. Hence, we expect INDEPENDENT and
MINIMAJOR to be negatively related to ADMISS.25
Table 2.2 presents the results of regression (2.1). It is revealed that VS-
PROD is positively related to a German film’s performance in terms of abso-
lute admission numbers. The significance of VS-PROD suggests that, appar-
ently, there is a group of production companies that consistently produces
exceptionally successful films. However, simply successful production com-
panies do not show any significantly positive effect, as documented by the
negative coefficient and the low t-values of the S-PROD variable. Hence, the
100,000 admission threshold seems too low to ensure that only consistently
above-average performing production companies gain from the reference film
principle.
The ex ante popularity index ACTOR shows weakly significant positive
effects. However, the coefficient of ACTOR is less than one. Our analysis
thus fails to support the existence of a superstar phenomenon. On the other
hand, directors have a large positive impact on admissions. Further, while
total admissions rise with a film’s budget, the elasticity is below one, indi-
cating that a higher budget investment does not necessarily pay itself back.
The significance of FBWHR suggests that critical appraisal is important
with respect to the box office appeal of a movie. Moreover, films without age
restrictions appear to have relatively good chances at the box office. Consid-
ering genre types, only dramas do significantly worse than the base category
comedy. Finally, with regard to film distribution we find, as expected, that
MINIMAJOR and INDEPENDENT are significantly negatively linked to a
German film’s absolute performance.
It is plausible that there is some degree of collinearity between the inde-
pendent variables. For instance, one might expect that high budgets, famous
25The primary estimation of (1) included three binary dummies that controlled for
the fact that the demand for motion pictures fluctuates considerably within a year. In
Germany, film-going is typically high around Christmas and in September, and low from
mid-April to the end of August. However, seasonal dummies showed no significance. As
omitting the variables had no notable effect on our estimates, we omit them.
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Regression (2.1)
Variables ADMISS
S-PROD - 0.01 (-0.03)
VS-PROD 1.08** (2.32)
COMM 0.62 ( 1.31)
COPRODUCTION -0.42 (-1.06)
ACTOR 0.70* (1.83)
DIRECTOR 1.02** (2.48)
BUDGET 0.46** (2.31)
FBWHR 1.16** (2.48)
FBWR -0.24 (-0.70)
DRAMA -0.57* (-1.68)
CHILDREN -0.65 (-1.08)
CRIME -0.06 (-0.12)
ACTION 0.04 (0.90)
FSK0 1.86* (1.88)
FSK6 0.95 (1.11)
FSK12 0.67 (0.82)
FSK16 0.14 (0.02)
MINIMAJOR -0.99** (-2.04)
INDEPENDENT -1.22*** (-2.83)
C 3.55 (1.25)
R2 0.56
Adjusted R2 0.48
Number of obs. 120
Notes: all continuous variables are in natural logarithms.
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.
*Statistically significant at p < 0.1.
**Statistically significant at p < 0.05.
***Statistically significant at p < 0.01.
Table 2.2: Determinants of Absolute Performance in the German Theatrical
Market
actors, well known directors and successful production companies are posi-
tively related. Therefore, we checked the regression and the data for signs
of multicollinearity, but found no signs indicating it. Regression coefficients
were stable when adding or deleting independent variables, standard errors of
coefficients were not conspicuous, and the correlation matrix showed no high
pairwise correlations between the independent variables (see Table A.2.6 in
the appendix to this chapter). Furthermore, the variance inflation factors
(VIF) of the independent variables were far below the critical value of 10
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suggested in the literature as a rule of thumb.26 Therefore, we conclude
multicollinearity is not an issue in our analysis.
2.3.4 Rate of Return Performance
Although the film industry seems focused on film attendance, from an eco-
nomic point of view, profits and rates of return are clearly more important.
Moreover, an analysis of rates of return allows us to test whether very suc-
cessful producers (VS-PROD) are also significantly positively related to rates
of return, i.e., whether they consistently produce more profitably than pro-
duction companies that fail to qualify for reference film funding. Therefore,
we seek empirical evidence on the determinants of the rate of return a film
generates.
Calculation of Rates of Return
We consider three perspectives on a film’s rate of return: the producer’s rate
of return (PROD-RoR), defined as a producer’s profits divided through the
film’s budget; the distributor’s rate of return (DIST-RoR), defined as a dis-
tributor’s profit divided through the cost for release prints and advertisement
(P&A); and the overall rate of return (RoR), i.e., the sum of both types of
profits divided through the sum of budget and P&A.
To calculate the specific rates of return a movie generates, it is necessary
to consider how box-office revenues are shared among exhibitors, distribu-
tors, and producers. Although contracts may vary for each movie, standard
agreements dominate the business. Usually, a share of 47% of the box office is
returned to the distributor.27 The further sharing among parties is described
by Eggers (1997), p. 101, in detail. Within a standard contract, a share of
65% is imputed to the cost of the distributor, while the other 35% remains
with the distributor, but is not imputed to recouping distribution costs. Once
distribution costs are fully recouped, the producer receives half of the addi-
tional distributor revenues. Moreover, the distributor usually guarantees a
minimum payment of about ¿ 500 per release print to the producer, irrespec-
tive of how the movie performs at the box office. This “minimum guarantee”
is added to the distribution costs that consist of the cost for release prints
and advertisement (P&A). For those movies where data is available P&A is
26See Kleinbaum, Kupper, and Muller (1988), p. 210.
27See Hauptverband Deutscher Filmtheater E.V. (1999), p. 3.
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on average ¿ 7,993 per release print (see Table A.2.7 in the appendix to this
chapter). Therefore, we consider this number for our profit calculations.
The producer’s revenue is also generated in ancillary markets (video,
DVD, pay TV and ad-supported TV, foreign sales, and in-flight entertain-
ment). Since production companies do not publish related data, we estimate
ancillary market revenues on the basis of an example given by Dr. Dieter
Frank, CEO of Bavaria Film, one of Germany’s leading production houses.28
He states that a German movie with 500,000 admissions yields about ¿ 1.50
per admission from domestic TV right sales, and about ¿ 0.30 from both
video and foreign sales, which totals ¿ 2.10 per admission. To calculate pro-
ducer’s profits, we add revenues calculated on the basis of these numbers to
the revenues from the theatrical market. Finally, assuming average admis-
sion prices of ¿ 5.00 in the theatrical market in the period between 1993 and
1998, we get our proxy for profits and associated rates of return.
Rate of Return Regressions
Following our calculations profits are negative for most films in the sample,
which implies negative rates of return. Therefore, a logarithmic transfor-
mation of the dependent variables is not possible and the Box-Cox trans-
formation technique cannot be applied. This has two implications. First,
the theoretical foundations of the following regressions might be considered
weaker than in regression (2.1). However, with respect to rates of return,
we could not model demand anyway as consumers do not pay for profits,
but rather for a seat in the movie theatre. Therefore, we have to consider
the following regressions against a more descriptive tenor. Second, since the
calculation of rates of return heavily depends on box office performance, the
distribution of these rates is also characterized by the blockbuster property,
i.e., outliers tend to dominate the means. Therefore, the least squares es-
timator is not necessarily the most efficient unbiased estimator.29 We thus
apply the l1-estimator with respect to our rate of return estimations. The
l1-estimator is more robust than least squares with respect to the form of the
underlying distribution of the disturbances and gives more powerful tests
(see Judge, Griffiths, Carter Hill, Lütkepohl, and Lee (1985), p. 836).30 This
28See Frank (1995).
29On the basis of the Shapiro-Wilk test for normality, we can clearly reject the normal
distribution of profits (the associated p-values are all smaller than 0.00001).
30This estimator is also known as the least absolute value (LAV) estimator, the least
absolute residual (LAR) estimator, the least absolute error (LAE) estimator, and the
minimum absolute deviation (MAD) estimator.
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leads to the following regressions:
RoR = β1+β2S-PROD+β3V S-PROD+β4COMM+β5COPR+ (2.2)
β6ACTOR+β7DIRECTOR+β8BUDGET+β9FBWHR+
β10FBWR+β11DRAMA+β12CHILD+β13CRIME+
β14ACTION+β15FSK0+β16FSK6+β17FSK12+
β18FSK16+β19MINIMAJOR+β20INDEPENDENT+ε2
PROD−RoR = γ1+γ2S-PROD+γ3V S-PROD+γ4COMM+γ5COPR+ (2.3)
γ6ACTOR+γ7DIRECTOR+γ8BUDGET+γ9FBWHR+
γ10FBWR+γ11DRAMA+γ12CHILD+γ13CRIME+
γ14ACTION+γ15FSK0+γ16FSK6+γ17FSK12+
γ18FSK16+γ19MINIMAJOR+γ20INDEPENDENT+ε3
DISTRoR = δ1+δ2S-PROD+δ3V S-PROD+δ4COMM+δ5COPR+ (2.4)
δ6ACTOR+δ7DIRECTOR+δ8BUDGET+δ9FBWHR+
δ10FBWR+δ11DRAMA+δ12CHILD+δ13CRIME+
δ14ACTION+δ15FSK0+δ16FSK6+δ17FSK12+
δ18FSK16+δ19MINIMAJOR+δ20INDEPENDENT+ε4
The results of regression (2.2) are displayed in Table 2.3.
Compared to regression (2.1), the results change considerably. While
very successful production companies, successful directors, and positive crit-
ical appraisal are still important for success, BUDGET is also significant,
but negatively related, to the financial success of the movies. This is well
in line with the result of regression (2.1), where the related coefficient inter-
preted as an elasticity is below one. Further, the coefficient of ACTOR is no
longer significant. Interestingly, distributors’ size is not significantly related
to overall profits while it has been negatively related to absolute admission
numbers. We will turn to this point later.
Note that the overall fit of regression (2.2) is extremely poor, with a
pseudo R2 value of only 0.07, compared to an adjusted R2 value of 0.48 in
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Regression (2.2)
Variables RoR
S-PROD -0.03 (-0.36)
VS-PROD 0.43*** (4.09)
COMM 0.02 (0.24)
COPRODUCTION -0.07 (-0.86)
ACTOR -0.01 (-0.25)
DIRECTOR 0.16* (1.86)
BUDGET -6.6 e-09* (1.87)
FBWHR 0.34*** (3.40)
FBWR 0.01 (0.15)
DRAMA -0.06 (-0.83)
CHILDREN -0.15 (-1.31)
CRIME -0.06 (-0.59)
ACTION -0.15 (-1.52)
FSK0 0.01 (0.02)
FSK6 -0.11 (-0.64)
FSK12 -0.12 (-0.69)
FSK16 -0.11 (-0.67)
MINIMAJOR -0.10 (-0.90)
INDEPENDENT -0.02 (-0.22)
C -0.85*** (-4.12)
Pseudo R2 0.07
Number of obs. 120
Notes: numbers in parentheses are t-statistics
*Statistically significant at p < 0.1
** Statistically significant at p < 0.05.
***Statistically significant at p < 0.01.
Table 2.3: Determinants of Overall Rates of Return
regression (2.1).31 This is similar to the results of De Vany and Walls (1999),
p. 310, who state: “That is as it should be, for were profits predictable every-
one would make them.” Nevertheless, the very successful type of production
companies and experienced directors do not seem to be “everybody,” but
special.
The results of the regression of producers’ rates of return are displayed in
Table 2.4. It is apparent that the basic set of significant explanatory variables
remains the same. Very successful production companies, successful direc-
tors, and positive critical appraisal are significant determinants of producer’s
31The pseudo R2 can be interpreted similarly to the R2. Judge, Griffiths, Carter Hill,
Lütkepohl, and Lee (1985), p. 767, formulate that the pseudo R2 measures the “uncer-
tainty” in the data explained by the empirical results.
2.3. Regression Analysis 22
Regression (2.3)
Variables PROD-RoR
S-PROD -0.05 (-0.93)
VS-PROD 0.34*** (5.37)
COMM 0.02 (0.31)
COPRODUCTION -0.07 (-1.25)
ACTOR 0.02 (0.59)
DIRECTOR 0.07* (1.90)
BUDGET -1.84e09* (-1.83)
FBWHR 0.20*** (3.39)
FBWR -0.01 (-0.32)
DRAMA -0.11** (-2.31)
CHILDREN -0.16** (-2.12)
CRIME -0.04 (-0.67)
ACTION -0.07 (-1.18)
FSK0 0.12 (0.92)
FSK6 -0.05 (-0.43)
FSK12 -0.02 (-0.16)
FSK16 -0.07 (-0.67)
MINIMAJOR -0.16** (-2.35)
INDEPENDENT -0.12** (-2.08)
C -0.70*** (-5.38)
Pseudo R2 0.14
Number of obs. 120
Notes: numbers in parentheses are t-statistics
*Statistically significant at p < 0.1
** Statistically significant at p < 0.05.
***Statistically significant at p < 0.01.
Table 2.4: Determinants of Producers’ Rates of Return
rates of return.
MINIMAJOR and INDEPENDENT are significantly negatively related
to performance here. This observation, together with our observations that
distributors’ size does not matter for overall rates of return, suggest that
smaller distributors may not perform systematically worse then larger dis-
tributors from their own point of view.
We find that this presumption is supported by the results of regression
(2.4) of the determinants of distributors’ profits displayed in Table 2.5.
Distributors’ size is not systematically linked with distributors’ rate of
return performance. In addition, there is no variable significantly related to
DIST-RoR. The overall fit of regression (2.4) is even poorer than all other
regressions, with an pseudo R2 value of only 0.06.
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Regression (2.4)
Variables DIST-RoR
S-PROD 0.02 (0.18)
VS-PROD 0.16 (1.18)
COMM -0.04 (-0.31)
COPRODUCTION -0.02 (-0.22)
ACTOR -0.01 (-0.02)
DIRECTOR 0.02 (0.20)
BUDGET -6.34e-09 (-1.02)
FBWHR 0.14 (1.06)
FBWR -0.01 (-0.13)
DRAMA -0.01 (-0.04)
CHILDREN -0.02 (-0.11)
CRIME -0.07 (-0.59)
ACTION -0.14 (-1.04)
FSK0 -0.01 (-0.03)
FSK6 0.07 (0.33)
FSK12 0.02 (0.13)
FSK16 0.05 (0.26)
MINIMAJOR 0.15 (1.08)
INDEPENDENT 0.21 (1.54)
C -0.30 (-1.13)
Pseudo R2 0.06
Number of obs. 120
Notes: numbers in parentheses are t-statistics
*Statistically significant at p < 0.1
** Statistically significant at p < 0.05.
***Statistically significant at p < 0.01.
Table 2.5: Determinants of Distributors’ Rates of Return
Why is this the case? We argue that this observation is most probably
linked to the amount of information available for producers and distributors.
Compared to the information available at the stage of film financing and
producing, the degree of uncertainty is much lower at the distribution level.
Above all, the film is completed when the distributor decides on the distribu-
tion strategy, i.e., the number of release prints and the advertising measures,
which account for distributor’s costs. Moreover, the degree of information
can further be increased by test screenings. This results in a relatively re-
liable estimate of the potential market for the film and, therefore, suitable
marketing strategies. In contrast, there is less information available and the
risk is higher when it comes to film production and financing. This might,
however, be an opportunity for highly skillful producers and directors with
the talent to produce films that enjoy above-average success, and, hence, we
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can detect their positive influence on a film’s success.
2.4 Profitability of German Movies
We have shown in the previous sections that production companies of the
VS-PROD type are consistently able to produce films with above-average
success, both in terms of total admission numbers and in terms of rates of
return. Therefore, production companies of the VS-PROD type meet the first
two conditions formulated in Section 2.2. This suggest that the reference film
principle might be favored over committee subsidies when films by VS-PROD
production companies fail to break even. Otherwise, reference subsidies tend
to go to deserving films anyhow.
Using our sample data, we investigate the question of cost coverage in a
disaggregated manner, i.e., for our three different types of production com-
panies. All movies that are international co-productions are not considered,
because our calculations of profits are based on domestic admission numbers.
Table 2.6 gives the related values.
The results displayed in Table 2.6 show clearly that there are no profits
in the German motion picture industry as long as we observe it on the ag-
gregated level. This is how the German motion picture business is usually
considered in public debate, and what provides a stimulus to subsidization.
However, with our disaggregated approach, it also turns out that production
companies from the VS-PROD type are on average profitable.32 Therefore,
we can conclude that the reference principle supports VS-PROD type pro-
duction companies, despite the fact that they principally operate at a profit.
Moreover, it is interesting to note that the average share of subsidies of movies
produced by the VS-PROD type is about 66% of the production budget and
that these 66% are not considered in the above profit calculations.
Note that in real life, it might not be obvious that the VS-PROD type
is profitable, since this type of production company also produces failures
on a regular basis. However, this is just a consequence of the inescapable
uncertainty attached to motion picture production. For instance, with re-
spect to the US market, Vogel (1998) points out: “And, in fact, of any 10
32We are aware that our results depend on the assumptions made about revenues in
ancillary markets. Therefore, we have calculated profits for very successful producers with
alternative assumptions of ancillary market revenues. It turned out that even with half of
the values given by Frank (1995) we would still find overall profits for the very successful
type of production companies. Therefore, we can consider profits to be positive even under
very restrictive assumptions.
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Production Company Types & Profits
PROD
Producer Distributor Overall
Average profits -1,359,989 -164,808 -1,524,797
Std. dev. 1,979,115 739,775
25% percentile -2,361,090 -369,909
Median -1,292,441 -86,253
75% percentile -561,769 -22,014
Sum of profits -88,438,226
n 58
S-PROD
Producer Distributor Overall
Average profits -88,282 372,999 284,717
Std. dev. 5,488,466 2,053,653
25% percentile -2,308,970 -669,596
Median -1,332,264 -122,711
75% percentile -498,781 19,861
Sum of profits 4,840,189
n 17
VS-PROD
Producer Distributor Overall
Average profits 1,183,417 998,190 2,181,607
Std. dev. 6,011,214 2,437,035
25% percentile -1,642,470 -423,797
Median -1,015,952 148,246
75% percentile 1,911,310 1,373,515
Sum of profits 30,542,498
n 14
Table 2.6: Production Company Types and Profits (in Euro)
major theatrical films produced, on the average, six or seven may be broadly
characterized as unprofitable.” (p. 31).
The question of profitability in the distribution sphere is answered in
Table 2.7. For the analysis of distributors’ profits we can use the whole
sample, since international co-productions do not have to be excluded to
allow for a proper calculation of profits.
Interestingly, the average profits in the distribution sphere are positive
for all types of distributors with a peak in the group of the mini-major type.
Moreover, the distribution of profits varies among distributor types. Notably,
the 75% percentile of the profits of independent distributors is negative, while
the 75% percentile of both other types is positive. This could indicate that
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Distribution Company Types & Profits
MAJOR MINIMAJOR INDEPENDENT
Average profits 170,555 932,085 104,701
Std. dev. 1,903,007 3,309,772 1,347,372
25% percentile -1,002,132 -528,362 -195,428
Median -527,579 -28,221 -63,962
75% percentile 98,562 473,032 -18,645
Sum of profits 3,581,655 32,622,975 6,700,864
n 21 35 64
Table 2.7: Distribution Company Types and Profits (in Euro)
independent distributors choose films with a higher economic risk than other
types of distributors.
2.5 Conclusion
Our analysis provides several results. First, a number of determinants of
performance of German movies have been identified. These are, above all,
production companies that were very successful in the past (VS-PROD), and
directors who have reached large audiences with their previous work. In other
words, the skills of the people that are closely related to managing film project
development and realization play an essential role in film performance. This
contrasts with the widely reported nobody knows character of the motion
picture business, since obviously some people do know at least a little more
than others about successful movie making.33 With respect, however, to
German circumstances, one might suspect that this observation is reinforced
by heavy film subsidization, since unsuccessful producers are not necessarily
driven out of the market and, hence, the range of talent in the industry might
be enlarged artificially.
Second, the determinants of the rates of return on films are related to the
determinants of film performance in terms of absolute admission numbers.
However, there are exceptions. For instance, regression results indicate a neg-
ative influence of high budgets on the rate of return on a film, although higher
budgets entail a positive effect on absolute admission numbers. Therefore,
it seems counterproductive to spend money, including subsidies, on movie
33To be clear, we do not say that some people can actually predict the success of a movie,
but that there are more talented people that do, on average, produce more successful
movies.
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projects with relatively high budgets. German films with high budgets do
not seem to pay themselves back.
Third, the reference film principle appears to support production com-
panies that have consistently above-average success with their films. While
our analysis suggests that this holds only for production companies of the
very successful type (VS-PROD), our disaggregated view on profits in the
German movie industry strongly suggests that production companies with
consistently above-average success are precisely the type that makes positive
profits. Essentially, this means that such production companies do not need
subsidies to produce their films.34 This is a clear drawback to the reference
film principle as specified in the German Film Act. While it sets incentives to
produce movies for the audience, the reference film principle de facto violates
a central condition for legitimate subsidies in that it tends to support firms
that do not need subsidies to produce their products! Moreover, the refer-
ence film principle is improperly defined in the economic sense; it rewards
absolute admission numbers rather than profitability. Combine this result
with the positive relation between budgets and absolute admission numbers
and the negative relation between budgets and profits, and we arrive at the
implication that the reference film principle sets incentives to produce films
with excessive budgets. The committee principle, on the other hand, weakens
the relationship between expenditures and earnings and distorts producers’
incentives to make films suited to audience preferences. Therefore, both
principles entail negative effects on economic efficiency.
Recognizing that subsidization of the German film industry is a political
reality, we suggest that an adjusted reference film principle may be prefer-
able. Such adjustments may demand that the reference film principle rewards
economic success instead of absolute admission numbers and that it reduces
producers’ “extra” profits, for instance, by prescribing some type of sharing
contract between the state and the producer. Incentives to produce for the
market could still be set, but “extra” profits would be limited.
Fourth, on examining the field of distribution, it became clear that dis-
tributors categorized as independents or mini-majors are negative determi-
nants of performance both in terms of admission numbers and producers’
34We stress here that even currently existing VS-PROD type production companies
would be in danger of bankruptcy if all subsidies were abolished. The reason is that these
companies produce only about 1 to 4 movies per year. Given the enormous uncertainty
attached to the movie business such a small number of projects would hardly provide
enough potential for risk diversification to assure the economic existence of such companies.
Therefore, the structure of the entire industry has to change to allow for non-subsidized
film production in Germany.
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profits. However, these results are not relevant to evaluating a distributor’s
skills, since there is no systematic relation between a distributor’s size and a
distributor’s profit performance. Moreover, there are clearly positive profits
in the distribution sphere, irrespective of the distributor type. Therefore,
subsidies in the distribution sphere are also questionable.
Finally, our analysis provides no evidence that supports the superstar hy-
pothesis on the basis of our necessarily arbitrary ex ante popularity measure
for actors. However, primarily with respect to the paramount positive effects
of very successful production companies and directors, we suggest that ad-
equate measures of talent and ex ante popularity may produce results that
support the superstar phenomenon in the sense of Rosen (1981) or Adler
(1985).
Chapter 3
The Economic Effects of the
New German Copyright
Contract Law
3.1 Introduction
In March 1999, the German Federal Secretary of Justice, Herta Däubler-
Gmelin, promised listeners at a symposium entitled “Culture is not free”
that a political decision for amendments to the German copyright law (GCL)
would promote the interests of creative workers.1 Subsequently, the Federal
Department of Justice set up a task force of five copyright experts to propose
draft amendments to the GCL.2 The task force’s proposal was presented in
May 2000 and served as the basis for the Federal Department of Justice’s
“legal draft of a law to enhance the contractual status of authors and per-
formers.” A modified version of that draft passed the Deutscher Bundestag
(German Parliament) and the Deutscher Bundesrat (Senate of the Federal
Parliament) in early 2002. The “act to enhance the contractual status of
authors and performers” takes effect July 1, 2002.3
The amended copyright law fosters the creation and use of collective re-
muneration schemes, and prescribes a strict legal claim for “corrections” of
contractual payments when the compensation paid the creative contractual
1See Däubler-Gmelin (1999).
2The members of the task force were the Professors A. Dietz, U. Loewenheim, W.
Nordemann, G. Schricker, and judge M. Vogel.
3Gesetz zur Stärkung der vertraglichen Stellung von Urhebern und ausübenden
Künstlern, 22.03. 2002, BGBl I, 1155-1158.
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party seems “disproportionate” (the “blockbuster” clause). The next Section
gives a more detailed description of the amended GCL.
The legislative motivation for changing the copyright law was to assert
“appropriate” compensation for creative workers in the film industry such as
directors, actors, and screen writers. The redistributive argument was central
to the drafting of the new GCL. This is illustrated by Däubler-Gmelin’s
comments on GCL before the German Parliament in 2001:
“The ‘Poor Poet’ of Spitzweg – you all know the painting – is, no,
can and must not be a correct description of the circumstances of the
lives of creative workers in the 21st century.”4
In addition, the law aims at protecting creative workers from financial
risks they would otherwise have shifted on them by their contractual part-
ners.5
Given that German citizens in general enjoy the right to freely contract,
why do legislators feel authors and performers need special protection? The
answer, apparently, is that film producers, broadcasters, and other firms in
the media industry enjoy a general “structural superiority,” which leads to
“unfair” and “unilaterally benefiting” contracts that exploit their creative
contractual counterparts.6
Däubler-Gmelin (2000), p. 765, grossly underestimated the potential
backlash, when she argued:
“In the general sense of justice, there is little to oppose in the
notion of appropriate compensation of creative talent, which shall be-
come a legal duty [under this amendment], aside from the fact that it
is rather novel for civil law to prescribe a just price for an output.”7
4Original: “Der ‘Arme Poet’ von Spitzweg - Sie alle kennen das Bild - ist, nein, kann und
darf keine korrekte Beschreibung der Lebensumstände der Kreativen im 21. Jahrhundert
sein” , Deutscher Bundestag (2001), p. 17715. Author’s translation. See also Bundesmin-
isterium der Justiz (2001).
5For instance, the risk argument appears in Bundesministerium der Justiz (2001), p.
17.
6See e.g., Däubler-Gmelin’s speech before the German Parliament (Deutscher Bun-
destag (2001).
7Original: “Gegen die angemessene Vergütung der Kreativen, wie sie zukünftig
zur gesetzlichen Verpflichtung gemacht werden soll, kann ja nach allgemeinem
Gerechtigkeitsverständnis so viel nicht einzuwenden sein, sieht man einmal davon ab,
daß es im Zivilrecht eine gewisse Neuheit darstellt, den gerechten Preis einer Leistung
gesetzlich vorzuschreiben”. Author’s translation.
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The media industry has excoriated the legislation,8 arguing that the pre-
scriptions under the amendment hurt film financing and production in Ger-
many, primarily through the introduction of legal uncertainty. Moreover,
legal scholars condemn the act’s inconsistency with labor legislation, consti-
tutional law, and European Law.9 Although, the initial proposal was subject
to many changes and the final, adopted version of the amendments to the
GCL is better defined than earlier drafts, the debate on the modified GCL
remains very much alive.10
This chapter provides an economic approach to the issue. Our focus lies
on the effects of the new GCL in the labor markets for creative talent.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 presents the main charac-
teristics of the new copyright law. Section 3.3 analyzes its effects from an
economic perspective. Section 3.3.1 considers how “structural superiority”
in terms of “labor monopsony” or “buyer power” may affect the industry.
Further the plausibility of significant buyer power in the German film indus-
try is discussed. Section 3.3.2 analyzes the potential effects of encouraging
the use of collective remuneration schemes. This is done with the help of
two standard models of union behavior: the “right-to-manage” model and
the “efficient bargain” model. Section 3.3.3 investigates effects of the “block-
buster” clause. It is shown that the clause may give rise to a link between
the efficient bargain model and the right-to-manage model. Further, its ef-
fects on risk allocation between producers and creative talent, incentives,
and transaction costs are considered. Section 3.3.4 analyzes aspects of legal
uncertainty introduced by the new GCL. Section 3.4 concludes.
3.2 The New German Copyright Law
As mentioned above, the amended copyright law seeks to counterbalance a
supposed “structural superiority” of the contracting counterparty of origina-
tors.11 Originators are defined as the creators of a work (§ 7 GCL). With
respect to motion pictures, however, it is difficult to specify who qualifies
8Industry lobbyists placed full page advertisements in prominent German newspapers
and broadcasters launched a spot advertising campaign against the new law.
9For legal analysis, see e.g., Thüsing (2002), Kreile (2001), Poll (2001), Schack (2001),
and Flechsig (2000). Gounalakis, Heinze, and Dörr (2001) provide a comprehensive and
in-depth juridical expert study of the Department of Justice’s draft of the new law.
10See e.g., Schwarz (2002).
11Despite the fact that it is the fundamental justification for the new law, no research
has been done to assess the plausibility of this assumption.
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as an originator under the GCL, since there are typically numerous major
creative contributors involved in making a movie. Moreover, there is no legal
rule to resolve this issue. In principle, then, several originators may become
copyright owners, e.g., the director, the screenwriter, and the editor. This
breaks with traditional case law, which (loosely) considers the director as
the originator,12 and the producer as the typical contractual counterpart.
In the following discussion, we divide these contractual parties as “origina-
tors,” “creative workers,” “creative talent,” and “authors” on one hand, and
“producers” on the other. The producer is typically in charge of bringing
production factors together needed to produce a movie. This includes hiring
the writer to write the original screenplay, signing the major actors and the
director, hiring the crew, doing the budget, and making sure the set gets
made on time.
The core change to the copyright law is the new § 32 GCL. Under § 32
GCL
 originators have a right to demand modification of their contract when
the arranged compensation is not “appropriate.”
This right is inalienable. Thus, where contractual compensation is not
considered appropriate, creative workers may claim additional payments.
So what is appropriate? The term “appropriate” can be inferred from the
interplay of § 32 and § 36 GCL. First, § 32 GCL provides a legal stipulation
that “collective remuneration schemes” are sufficient to guarantee appropri-
ateness.13 Second, § 36 GCL states that “associations of originators” may
bargain with “associations of producers” or “single producers” about such
remuneration schemes. Apparently, the authors of the legislation sought to
encourage the making and application of a sort of collective wage agreement.
While adoption of collective compensation schemes is voluntary, one can
reasonably expect that collective remuneration schemes will generally be ac-
cepted in the industry to take advantage of the associated legal certainty.14
In any case, judges will resort to the legal presumption of collective remu-
neration schemes in legal disputes over appropriate wages. Therefore, we
12See Brehm (2001), p. 28. Note that the new GCL explicitly extends the scope of
addressees of the copyright law. Section 3.3.4 discusses this issue.
13So far, however, what exactly defines such collective remuneration schemes is an open
question.
14More precisely, the extent of a firm’s deviation from collectively bargained compen-
sation schemes depends on the expected litigiousness of the creative talent, the expected
cost of legal disputes, and the firm’s discount rate. If the firm’s reputation is important,
there may be no deviation at all.
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assume the new GCL establishes de facto industry-wide use of collective
remuneration schemes.
The new copyright contract law also refers to the “blockbuster” phe-
nomenon that can be found in many creative industries.15 Under § 32a GCL
 originators have a right to demand a change in their contract when their
previous agreed compensation appears “disproportionate” from an ex
post perspective, i.e., the originator’s claim depends on the performance
of the creative product.
As this right cannot be waived, the amended GCL introduces some type
of mandatory sharing in such contracts. Interestingly, the authors of the
legislation apparently doubt that the collective remuneration schemes they
suggest are sufficient to guarantee appropriate compensation, so they explic-
itly added ex post compensation rules. Nevertheless, the legislator considers
that collective remuneration schemes are sufficient to guarantee appropriate
compensation provided that the respective collective compensation scheme
explicitly include ex-post compensation rules.16 Previous GCL also included
a “blockbuster” clause. However, since its conditions of entitlement were
very restrictive the clause was actually not enforced.
3.3 Economic Effects of the New GCL
In the following discussion, it is shown that the recent amendments to the
copyright law have the potential to affect numerous explicit and implicit
characteristics of labor contracts such as wages, income distribution, the
allocation of risk between producers and creative talent, incentives, efforts,
and transaction costs.
As the impact of the new GCL depends largely on the assumed market
structure in the markets for creative labor, we state that, in general, we can
only expect to see potentially positive effects from the new law in the event
of a market failure. We begin our analysis by exploring the effects and the
plausibility of the presumed “structural superiority” of producers, which has
been used to justify the new law.
15Chapter 2 discusses empirical evidence of the “blockbuster property” in the German
motion picture industry.
16Note that the “blockbuster” clause 32a GCL is also effective for existing contracts,
i.e., authors have a right to change existing contracts, if disproportionate gains arise after
the law has become effective.
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3.3.1 Initial Considerations with Regard to “Structural
Superiority”
Monopsony
In economic terms, the supposed “structural superiority” of producers may
best be described by the terms “buyer power” or “labor monopsony.” 17
Robinson (1969), p. 215, first used the term “monopsony” to describe a
market with a single buyer. Today the expression “labor monopsony” is
applied to any model where individual firms face positively inclined labor
supply curves. The consequences of monopsony can be analyzed with a
simple “isolated firm” model. Assume a firm produces films by employing
labor (L). The wage (w) is, due to the labor market monopsony, a function of
the number of creative workers that are hired such that w = w(L) represents
the inverse labor supply function, with dw/dL > 0. Thus, the firm’s profit
function is
π(L) = R(L)− w(L)L,
where R denotes the firm’s revenue function. R is assumed to be strictly
concave and twice continuously differentiable. Profit maximization gives
dR(L)
dL
= w(L) +
dw(L)
dL
L
or
R
′
= MLC,
where R
′
denotes the monopsonist’s marginal revenue product of labor.18
MLC denotes the marginal cost of labor, which reflects not only the cost of
the last employee employed, but also the difference in wage the monopsonist
must pay for all previously employed workers, i.e., dw(L)/dL. Figure 3.1
displays the associated amount of labor employed (Lm) and the associated
17The following discussion of monopsony borrows from the survey of Boal and Ransom
(1997).
18R
′
can be considered the monopsonist’s “hypothetical labor demand function,” al-
though, strictly speaking, a monopsonist has no demand function since price and quantity
are determined simultaneously. Here, the “hypothetical demand function” involves the
same information as a regular demand function. See Blair and Harrison (1993).
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wage (wm) earned by the creative talent. Note that wm is the lowest possi-
ble level the monopsonist must pay the creative talent to employ the profit
maximizing level of labor Lm.
Wc
R'
Wage
Labor  Supply
EmploymentLc
Wm
L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Figure 3.1: Wage and Employment Determination under Monopsony
Compare this to the competitive outcome. In a competitive labor market,
the wage no longer depends on the quantity of labor employed by a single
firm, but is determined by the market. It follows that each firm employs
labor until the marginal revenue product equals marginal costs, which is
determined at wc. Hence, the firm hires the quantity Lc. This result is
efficient. We can see that under monopsony both wages and employment are
lower than under competition. The associated welfare loss compared to the
competitive outcome is given by∫ Lc
Lm
[R
′
(L)− w(L)]dL.
Following Pigou (1924), p. 754, we may also define a measure of “ex-
ploitation” denoted by E. The first-order condition can be rearranged to
R
′
= w(L) +
dw(L)
dL
w(L)
w(L)
L
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and we may write
E ≡ R
′ − w
w
= ε−1, with ε =
dL
dw
w(L)
L
E measures the deviation of wages from R
′
in percentage terms and is
inverse to the elasticity of labor supply. The more elastic the labor supply
function, the less monopsony power exists.19 If dw/dL = 0, the labor supply
is perfectly elastic and there is no monopsony power.20 In general, monopsony
power is weaker in the long run as long-run labor supply elasticities are
typically larger than short-run elasticities. Workers can change jobs, move,
or acquire skills to qualify for other professions. Under such a dynamic labor
supply regime, the monopsonist must weigh short-run gains from exploitation
against dynamic supply responses. Boal and Ransom (1997) present a simple
model of dynamic labor supply that incorporates such considerations. They
find that, within this setting, E is a weighted average of short-run and long-
run inverse elasticities and depends positively on the monopsonist’s discount
rate. Hence, E may be smaller if the dynamics of labor supply are taken into
account. Such considerations may help to understand why related empirical
literature indicates monopsony power is relatively weak. Empirical studies on
labor monopsony power show that even in textbook examples of monopsony
such as the case of public school teachers in rural areas or coal mining, the
rates of exploitation are very low and sometimes approach zero (see e.g.,
Luitzer and Thornton (1986); Beck (1993); Boal (1995)).
Thus, while the basic monopsony model provides a valuable reference for
the effects of buyer power, it is unlikely to fit many real world situations. In-
stead, one is much more likely to encounter oligopsonistic market structures,
whereby several firms operate in a market. As we show below, the German
film industry is characterized by such a market structure. Therefore, we turn
our analysis to buyer power within a Cournot model.
19However, E is not a measure of the deviation of wages from their competitive level
when R
′
is not a horizontal line. For a short discussion of conditions that might imply a
horizontal R
′
line, see Boal and Ransom (1997), p. 88.
20Under competition, E equals zero, because the marginal revenue product equals the
wage.
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Cournot Competition
The Cournot model assumes that firms simultaneously decide what quantity
to produce.21 Since creative labor is demanded in more or less fixed pro-
portions to output, for instance, there is typically one director per film, it
is straightforward to consider that broadcasters play an employment-setting
game.
Consider a simple one-stage game in which two firms i, j choose their
quantities of labor demand Li and Lj simultaneously. The firm i’s profit
function is given by
πi(Li, Lj) = Ri(Li)− Liw(L), with L = Li + Lj
where Ri denotes firm i’s revenue function. Each firm now maximizes
its profits given the expected quantity of labor demand chosen by the other
firm. The first-order condition of firm i is
π
′
i = R
′
i(Li)− w(L)− Liw
′
(L) = 0.
Generalized to the case of n firms let
L ≡
n∑
i=1
Li,
and the first-order condition of firm i remains
π
′
i = R
′
i(Li)− w(L)− Liw′(L) = 0.
We now define a firm-specific rate of exploitation Ei by rearranging the
equation above to
21This assumption of competition in quantities well fits decision-making in the film
industry. Producers and broadcasters typically decide on the number of films they will
produce. For instance, broadcasters produce according to a previously set up program
scheme. Since creative labor is more or less hired in fixed proportions to the output,
this fits the Cournot model. Otherwise, Bertrand competition implies that producers
set wages first and employ every worker willing to work at that wage level. This seems
rather implausible. Further, the Cournot model implies the strongest “anti-competitive”
outcomes for general oligopsony models. Therefore, the analysis of Cournot competition
can be regarded as a “worst case” oligopsony analysis of buyer power.
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R′i − w(L) = Liw
′ w(L)
w(L)
L
L
= Li
w(L)
L
ε−1,
such that
Ei ≡
R
′
i(Li)− w(L)
w(L)
=
Li
L
ε−1.
Obviously, Ei is the same for all firms in the symmetric case, i.e., where
R
′
i is equal for all firms. Note that Ei is decreasing in the number of firms
in the market. In the asymmetric case, where R
′
i differs across firms, an
employment-weighted average of these individual rates of exploitation can
be expressed by
E ≡
n∑
i=1
Ei
Li
L
= [
n∑
i=1
(
Li
L
)2]ε−1,
where the expression in brackets represents the Herfindahl-Hirschmann
index H. This concentration index is based on market shares that can be
represented per unit (which implies that the maximum value of H is 1) or
in percent (which implies that the maximum value of H is 10, 000). Note
that there is no unambiguous relationship between the concentration of firms
and the market outcome, because a firm’s market shares are endogenous and
depend on n and the distribution of R
′
among firms.22
Nevertheless, H may provide an useful indication of possible buyer power
for practical purposes (Tirole (1992), p. 223). For instance, the US Depart-
ment of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission use the index in guidelines
for evaluating mergers.23 Similarly, Dobson, Waterson, and Chu (1998), p.
13, suggest in a paper prepared for the UK Office of Fair Trading, “In the
case of oligopsony, generally the greater the concentration of buyers then the
greater is the distortion in factor price and quantity below the competitive
level, other things being equal.” The N -firm concentration ratio (CR-N) is
22For instance, if one firm systematically realizes a higher margin revenue product, it will
also yield a higher market share. More generally, it can be stated that with asymmetric
firms concentration need not be related systematically to welfare. Note that, although
E and H are endogenous, a positive correlation between E and H can be interpreted as
evidence of buyer power. The reason is that, in the case of perfect competition, E equals
zero.
23According to these guidelines, market concentration can be broadly characterized as
unconcentrated if H < 1000, moderately concentrated if 1000 < H < 1800, and highly
concentrated if H > 1800 (Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission (1997)).
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another measure of concentration. It simply adds up the individual market
shares of the N -largest (measured in terms of market share) firms in the
market.
The Herfindahl-Hirschmann index is a more useful concentration mea-
sure than the N -firm ratio, because the N -firm ratio does not reflect the
distribution of market shares among the N firms. Nevertheless, the N -firm
ratio is used by competition authorities, for instance, by the German Bun-
deskartellamt and the Australian competition authority (see Bundeskartel-
lamt (2001)).
A somewhat more direct relationship between the number of firms in the
market and oligopsony power can be described within a symmetric Cournot
model if we assume that w(L) = L. Under this assumption, the first-order
condition of firm i becomes
π
′
i = R
′
i(Li)− L− Li = 0.
In the symmetric case, we have L = nLi and may write
R′i(Li)− nLi − Li = 0
or
Li =
R′i(Li)
(1 + n)
.
Since we know that w(L) = L and L = nLi, it follows that
w(L) = R′i(Li)
n
(1 + n)
.
This implies that, with an increasing number of firms in the industry, w
converges rather quickly to the competitive outcome, whereby w = R
′
.
Experimental evidence on number effects in the symmetric Cournot model
indicate that the role of the number of firms in the market is potentially
more important than the Cournot model suggests. Huck, Normann, and
Oechssler (2001) show that three-firm oligopolies tend to confirm the Cournot
prediction, while more than three firms typically produce results that surpass
the Cournot outcome in the direction of the competitive result.24 In contrast,
24Note that Huck, Normann, and Oechssler (2001) consider the case of oligopoly, rather
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two firms tend to surpass the Cournot outcome in the opposite direction.25
In summary, our discussion suggests that the legislative presumption of
“structural superiority” may be described by “labor monopsony,” which rep-
resents a type of market failure. Our analysis further suggests that a large
number of firms and low concentration rates in the labor markets of the Ger-
man motion picture industry limit the extent of potential exertion of such
buyer power. The next section explores number and concentration char-
acteristics in these markets to check the plausibility of a presumption of
“structural superiority.”
Plausibility of Significant Buyer Power
Any analysis of buyer power needs to define the relevant market. In the
case of the German film industry, there exist numerous single labor markets,
i.e., each creative profession in the German film industry addressed by the
new GCL may be considered to operate in a separate labor market. We
can reasonably restrict our analysis here to the concentration of firms in the
output market, since creative labor is hired in more or less fixed proportions
to the output. Hence, concentration in the output market reflects buyer
concentration in the input markets. More specifically, we consider two output
markets. First, the “theatrical market,” which consists of German motion
pictures produced for initial release in theatres. Second, the “market for
German television fiction,” which requires contributions from creative talent
for products such as TV dramas or serials. While we make this distinction
partly in deference to data availability, it should be noted that creatives
themselves distinguish between working for the “big screen” and television.
The theatrical market is characterized by a large number of small produc-
tion companies. In 2000, there were 127 companies involved in the production
of 75 theatrical movies. 108 companies were attached to the production of
just one movie (Roth (2001), p. 19). Production companies are often related
to larger vertically integrated media companies such as Kirch Media, CTL-
than oligopsony. However, the cases may be viewed to produce analogous results. As
Dobson, Waterson, and Chu (1998), p. 13, put it:“...it is straightforward to apply the
principles of oligopoly theory to model situations of oligopsony where strategic interaction
occurs between a few buyers competing in a market...”.
25Number effects may also be important with respect to potential collusion of buyers.
Following Blair and Harrison (1993), p. 43, there may be structural conditions that impede
such acting. One of these conditions is a “fewness of buyers”. It is argued that the smaller
the number of buyers and the higher the concentration in the market the lower the cost
of reaching, implementing and controlling an agreement. Conditions that may facilitate
collusion are: homogeneous products, a low elasticity of supply, and sealed bids.
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Production-Group Market Share
Kirch 0.15
ZDF 0.09
WDR 0.07
RTL Group 0.07
Arte 0.06
CR-3 0.31
CR-5 0.44
Source: SPIO, Media Perspektiven, own calculations.
Table 3.1: Market Concentration in German Theatrical Film Production in
2000
UFA, or public broadcasters that are sometimes referred to as “production-
groups” (Röper (2000)). For this reason, we have classed each production
company that is owned (disregarding the actual stake) by a larger media
company or public broadcaster to these production-groups. Table 3.1 indi-
cates the market shares of the largest production groups in theatrical film
production in 2000 and gives associated N -firm concentration ratios (CR-
N).26
As is apparent, the concentration ratios in the market are low. Com-
26The allocation of production companies to production-groups is based on the infor-
mation about firm’s stakes provided by Media Perspektiven (2001). Further, M. Roth of
SPIO provided a listing of the production companies of all German theatrical movies in
2000. Where more than one production-group was involved in the production of a movie
(which was the case in eight instances and involved three production groups) each of the
N groups was considered to have a share of 1/N of the movie. Where a production-
group co-produced with one or more foreign firms, we counted the maximal one of these
foreign companies to receive a prudent result. The potential influence of (independent)
co-producing German firms was completely ignored so that the larger production group
received the entire associated market share. Thus, our computation is likely to overesti-
mate actual market shares. Due to the insolvency of parts of the “Kirch Group” in 2002,
the market structure will likely change in the future. However, it is an open question as
to whether we will observe higher or lower concentration ratios. RTL Group was created
in early 2000 following the merger of CLT-UFA, a TV and radio group owned by Bertels-
mann AG (with the German newspaper group WAZ) and the Belgian-Canadian Groupe
Bruxelles Lambert (GBL), with the British production company Pearson TV owned by
the UK-based media group Pearson plc. In July 2001, Bertelsmann became majority
shareholder of RTL Group following a stock swap with GBL. In December 2001, Bertels-
mann entered into an agreement with Pearson plc to acquire its 22% stake in RTL Group,
raising Bertelsmann’s interest in RTL Group to 89%. The remaining 11% of RTL Group
is publicly traded (www.rtlgroup.com, May 19, 2002).
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pared to the benchmark levels of the German competition authority, which
presumes joint market dominance in the case of CR-3≥ 50% and CR-5≥ 67%
(Bundeskartellamt (2001)), such concentrations are indeed very low. There-
fore, we suggest that buyer power is clearly insignificant in the theatrical
market.
The market for television fiction is also characterized by a large number
of small production companies. In 1998, there were 101 German production
companies that produced 300 movies for television, i.e., TV dramas or serials
with run times of about 90 minutes (Röper (2000), p. 19). As in the theatrical
market, vertical integration is also a feature of the television market.27 Table
3.2 indicates the market shares of the largest production groups in television
market in the year 1998 and gives associated N -firm concentration ratios
(CR-N).28
Obviously, concentration ratios are also low in the market for German
television fiction. As a whole, this suggests that buyer power is not significant
in the labor markets associated to the production of movies in Germany.
The term “structural superiority” applied to in the German motion pictures
industry appears to be a political phrase without economic equivalent.
Therefore, we may conclude that the new copyright law uses a misleading
presumption about the German motion picture industry.
We now examine the economic effects of the new law. We first consider
legally fostered collective remuneration schemes, then examine the effects of
the blockbuster clause.
27Note that Röper (2000) considers the market for productions made for hire only.
Therefore, potential productions produced by the broadcasters themselves are neglected.
Such productions are a rare with respect to TV dramas and serials. Only news, sports, and
magazine-type shows are typically produced by broadcasters Lange (1997), p. 3. Thus,
Röper (2000) provides data that is relevant to our analysis.
28Röper (2000) allocates a production company to a production-group, if the production-
group has a stake of 25% or more. In the case of N co-producing production-groups each
of the N groups was considered to have a share of 1/N of the market. Market shares are
based on minutes run time. Note that Table 3.2 considers the production of television
fiction as a whole, i.e., it includes programs such as soaps and talk shows. However,
this may actually contribute to overestimating buyer concentration in television movie
production, because the production of soaps is more concentrated than total television
production and accounts for a relatively high share of total production (Röper (2000), p.
24). Further, Röper (2000) states that television movie production is characterized by
“intense competition”, p. 19.
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Production Group Market Share
CTL-UFA 0,15
Springer 0,08
Kirch 0,06
Holtzbrinck 0,04
Studio Hamburg 0,03
Tele-München/Kloiber 0,03
Bavaria 0,02
Heinrich Bauer Verlag 0,02
CR-3 0.29
CR-5 0.36
CR-8 0.44
Source: Röper (2000), own calculations.
Table 3.2: Market Concentration in German Television Fiction Production
in 1998
3.3.2 Effects of Collective Remuneration Schemes
The effects of collective remuneration schemes promulgated by §32 of the new
GCL may be analyzed with the help of models of trade union behavior.29 The
literature discusses two standard types of models of the influence of unions
on wage and employment: the “right-to-manage” model and the “efficient
bargain” model.30 Both models utilize the idea that unions have indifference
curves defined over wages and employment,31 but the models differ in their
assumptions regarding what unions and employers bargain about. While the
right-to-manage model assumes that the parties negotiate about wages only,
the efficient bargain model considers that negotiations are over wages and
employment levels. These assumptions are crucial for the implications of
the models. The efficient bargain model can result in outcomes with more-
than-efficient, less-than-efficient, or efficient employment levels. In contrast,
the right-to-manage model generally implies less-than-efficient employment
levels.
29See Creedy and McDonald (1991) for a review of such models.
30The expression “right-to-manage” model was suggested by Nickell (1982).
31Several types of union utility functions have been suggested in the literature. Os-
wald (1982) proposes a function that defines union utility as the sum of the utilities of its
members. The union’s maximization problem then depends on the expected utility de-
rived from employment and unemployment of each member. Other versions such as those
contained in McDonald and Solow (1981) include the alternative wage available without
unions.
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Although we will show that the assumptions of the efficient bargain model
are poorly suited to the provisions of § 32 GCL, this model is presented first,
because, as we will see, the blockbuster clause provides a link between the
efficient bargain and the right-to-manage model.
Efficient Bargain Model
The idea of the bargaining contract curve with respect to the unionization of
the labor market was first proposed by Leontief (1946) and later developed
by McDonald and Solow (1981). Labor is considered essential for production,
so that the firm’s profit is zero when no bargain can be agreed on. Following
McDonald and Solow (1981), the union’s objective function can be written
as
U = u(wu, L, wa),
where wu denotes the real wage the union can achieve, wa is the alter-
native real wage available without unions and L is the employment level of
organized workers. The objective function is assumed to be twice continu-
ously differentiable and strictly quasi-concave. Further, assume that its first
partial derivatives with respect to wu and L are strictly positive.
32 This ob-
jective function gives the union’s indifference map as shown in Figure 3.2,
where the unions preference order is I3 > I2 > I1. The profit maximizing
firm’s indifference map consists of isoprofit curves derived from the firm’s
profit function
π(wu, L) = R(L)− wuL,
where R(L) is assumed to be strictly concave and twice continuously
differentiable in L. Firm’s seek to reach their most preferred isoprofit curve,
which, in this case, is π3. Accordingly, the isoprofit curves in Figure 3.2 are
such that for the firm π3 > π2 > π1 > πmin. In a competitive labor market
the firm’s demand curve for labor R
′
cuts through the peak points of its
isoprofit curves.
The contract curve is formed by the points of tangency between the em-
ployer’s isoprofit curves and the union’s indifference curves and lies between
C at the lowest wage the union will accept, and C
′
, which is the lowest
level of profit πmin that the firm will accept. MaCurdy and Pencavel (1986)
32It is also assumed that the union does not affect the overall price level in the economy.
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Figure 3.2: Contract Curve Formation in the Efficient Bargain Model
suggest that there exist three potential types of contract curves, which are
illustrated in Figure 3.3.
They analyze how the form of the contract curve depends on the specific
objective function of the union. If the union’s objective function is U =
[wu−wa]L, i.e., a form of rent maximization, then the contract curve within
their framework is vertical as displayed by CC ′′ in Figure 3.3 (MaCurdy and
Pencavel (1986), p. S13). If we assume that the alternative wage wa is the
competitive wage, this implies that the employment level is efficient. For
other objective functions, contract curves such as CC ′ and CC ′′′ are feasible.
This implies that collective wage schemes may result in more, less or equal
employment than under the alternative setting without unions. Therefore,
the efficient bargain model is only efficient in the sense that is satisfies the
preferences of the union and the firm. From society’s standpoint, the efficient
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Figure 3.3: Possible Forms of Contract Curves in the Efficient Bargain Model
bargain model generally implies a misallocation of resources as employment
levels differ from the competitive level. Moreover, since profits will always be
lower with unions, some firms may exit the market. Therefore, unions may
indirectly lead to lower levels of employment regardless the actual shape of
the contract curve.
Right-to-Manage Model
Just as with the efficient bargain model the right-to-manage model assumes
that unions and firms have objective functions such as those used above.
Again, it is assumed that the firm will negotiate with the union, because,
without a bargained agreement, profits are zero.
The right-to-manage model immediately appears better suited to our
analysis than the efficient bargain model. First, it does not assume that
creative workers and producers bargain over both wage and employment lev-
els – only wages are subject to negotiations. This fits the prescriptions of the
new GCL, which explicitly refers to the determination of wages only. Sec-
ond, it has been argued in the literature that unions rarely negotiate directly
about employment levels (e.g., Brown and Ashenfelter (1986)).33
33Another view is that bargaining about work practices may be a sufficient proxy for
direct negotiations over employment levels (McDonald and Solow (1981)). However, the
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The right-to-manage model assumes that, while the union can influence
wages, the firm is free to set its profit-maximizing level of employment. Thus,
there is bargaining over wages only when employers control employment. The
negotiated wage then depends on the union’s and the employer’s relative
bargaining power. More specifically, the right-to-manage model generates
outcomes in the wage and employment space that lie along each firm’s labor
demand curve R
′
. This is because each point on the demand curve represents
the profit-maximizing employment level for a given wage. The outcome is
characterized by the tangency between the firm’s labor demand curve R
′
and
the union’s indifference curve I as depicted in Figure 3.4.
Wa
R'
Wage
Labor  Supply
EmploymentLa
Wu
I
Lu
·
Figure 3.4: Wage and Employment Determination under the Right-to-
Manage Model
In general, the negotiated wage wu is higher than the alternative wage
wa, while the employment level Lu is lower than La.
34 If we assume that wa
appropriateness of such an approximation is controversial. For a review, see Clark (1990).
Farber (1986) suggests that there may be no negotiations over employment levels due to an
incentive problem. In the efficient bargain model, the marginal revenue product is generally
less than the wage, which gives an incentive for the firm to behave opportunistically in
that it reduces employment at the negotiated wage.
34When the union completely controls the bargaining process, the right-to-manage
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Union Model
Efficient Bargain Right-to-Manage
Direct Effects:
Wage + +
Total Worker Remuneration + +
Employment ? -
Profits - -
Efficiency -a -
Indirect Effects:
Total Worker Remuneration - -
Employment - -
aOnly for vertical contract curves efficient levels of employment are possible.
Table 3.3: Economic Effects of Collective Remuneration Schemes Under Dif-
ferent Models of Union Behavior
equals the competitive wage wc, a welfare loss
∫ Lc
Lm
[R
′
(L)−w(L)]dL is created.
A rise or decrease in the overall remuneration of creative workers depends
on the elasticities of labor demand and supply. Nevertheless, for a wide
range of elasticities an increase in the overall income of creative workers can
reasonably be assumed. On the other hand, the firm’s profits will fall unless
the union has no bargaining power. This may entail an indirect negative effect
on creative workers, since decreasing profits may trigger cuts of employment
to the extent that producers exit the market. Table 3.3 recapitulates the
effects of § 32 GCL according to the efficient bargain and the right-to-manage
model.
Overall, we may conclude that the legally encouraged application of col-
lective remuneration schemes by the new GCL will lead to higher wages for
those creative workers that are employed. It may well be possible that total
remuneration to creative workers is lower, however, when indirect effects of
collective remuneration schemes are considered. In any case, efficiency losses
can be expected.
model is equivalent to the traditional textbook union monopoly model. On the other
hand, if the firm controls the negotiations, then (wa, La) is the solution. See Manning
(1987) for a detailed analysis.
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3.3.3 Effects of the “Blockbuster” Clause
According to § 32a of the new GCL originators have the right to demand a
change of an existing contract, if the previously agreed on payment is dis-
proportionate from an ex-post perspective. In economic terms this can be
interpreted as a provision that prescribes the introduction of sharing con-
tracts. This may affect transaction costs, the allocation of risk between
producers and creative talent, and producers’ and creative talent’s efforts.35
The bargaining process between unions and producers may also be affected
by that prescription. We turn to the latter point first.
The Right-to Manage Model Reconsidered
Anderson and Devereux (1989) argue that the adoption of profit-sharing
contracts may provide a link between the right-to-manage and the efficient
bargain models of trade union behavior. An optimal contract can use profit-
sharing to establish the efficient bargain outcome within a right-to-manage
framework. To see this, we first consider the efficient bargain solution. As-
sume the firm’s profit function is
π(wu, L) = R(L)− wuL
and the unions’s utility is represented by
U(wu, L, wa) = Lu(wu) + (L −L)u(wa),
35Some of the arguments we discuss in the following have also been analyzed in the
context of the Droit de Suite, which is a legal instrument that is concerned with the idea
of protecting artist. The Droit de Suite entitles an artist to a portion of the revenues
(French version) or the capital gain (Italian version) obtained from all future resales of his
artwork. Perloff (1998) summarizes much of the economic literature on the issue. However,
though it provides a good starting point the wisdom provided by that literature is only
partly transferable on the analysis of the new GCL. First, the literature does not refer
to the issue of collective remuneration schemes. Second, its focus often refers to specific
characteristics of the production of artworks such as paintings instead of motion pictures.
For instance, Solow (1998) concentrates on the question how the Droit de Suite affects the
individual artist’s incentives to produce art at different points in time. The idea behind his
analysis is that the financial interest in sold works that is generated by the Droit de Suite
provides an incentive to maintain the future value of the artist’s work by restricting or
expanding future output. This argument, however, comes form the theory of the durable
goods monopolist as described by Coase (1972). Since the demand for motion pictures in
general declines sharply in time the analysis does not seem to be applicable to that market
(see e.g., De Vany and Walls (1999)).
3.3. Economic Effects of the New GCL 50
where L is total union membership. In addition, assume that labor is
essential for production, so that the firm’s profit is zero if no bargain can be
agreed on. Then the bargaining process is characterized by the generalized
Nash solution, where the optimal pair (w∗u, L
∗) solves the problem
max B∗ = π(wu, L)
(1−α)(L(u(wu)− (u(wa)))α
with respect to wu and L. The parameter α is the relative bargaining
power of the union, with α ∈ [0, 1]. This gives the solution
RL = w
∗
u − [(u(w∗u)− u(wa)/u′(w∗u)], (3.1)
w∗u = (1− α)RL + α
R
L∗
. (3.2)
The first of the two equations describes the optimal employment rule for
the efficient bargain. Since RL is smaller than w
∗
u the optimal wage lies above
the labor demand curve unless the union’s relative bargaining strength α is
zero. In Figure 3.5 this is depicted as point N , which lies on the union-firm
contract curve CC ′′′.
Now assume that employment is determined unilaterally by the firm, i.e.,
a right-to manage approach. Further, consider the introduction of a profit-
sharing compensation scheme
y = wfix +
λ
L
[R− wfixL], (3.3)
where y is total income per worker, wfix is the fixed payment per worker
and λ/L is the profit-share that is paid to each worker. Then the firm’s profit
function is
π(wfix, L, λ) = R− yL = (1− λ)(R− wfixL). (3.4)
This implies that the firm’s optimal employment level is given by
RL = wfix. (3.5)
Note that the optimal employment level is independent of the profit share
parameter λ, because the profit-sharing contract operates like a neutral profit
tax. Now consider that the union and the firm bargain over wfix and λ
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subject to the restriction that employment is determined by equation (3.5).
Then the optimal bargain can be defined as the pair (w̄fix,λ̄), that is given
by the solution of the problem
max B∗ = π(wfix, L, λ)
(1−α)(L(u(y)− (u(wa)))α
with respect to wfix and λ and subject to equations (3.3) and (3.5).
Anderson and Devereux (1989), p. 430, show that the first-order conditions
with respect to wfix and λ to hold simultaneously require that α = λ̄, i.e.,
that the optimal profit-share equals union power in the bargain. Then using
equations (3.3) and (3.4) implies that
ȳ = (1− α)RL + α
R
L
, (3.6)
where ȳ denotes the optimal total income per worker. Furthermore, wfix
can be written as
w̄fix = ȳ − [u(ȳ)− u(wa)/u′(ȳ)], (3.7)
where w̄fix is the optimal fixed income per worker. Now it is clear that
equations (3.5) and (3.6) are identical to (3.1) and (3.2). Therefore, the
optimal profit-sharing scheme within the right-to-manage model replicates
the outcome of the efficient bargain model.36 Why is this the case? An
efficient contract in general requires that there are negotiations over both
employment and the division of total surplus.37 A profit-sharing contract
can achieve the same, since it allows for an independent choice of the fixed
wage and the profit-sharing parameter. Figure 3.5 illustrates this result.
The fixed wage wfix is chosen so that the firm chooses point S on the
labor demand curve.38 The total income per worker is then determined by
the associated efficient-bargain point on the contract curve N . Employment
36The result of the equivalence between the profit-sharing contract and the efficient
bargain model does not depend on the particular union’s objective function used here.
However, α = λ̄ only holds for the union’s preference functions that are linear in employ-
ment. See Anderson and Devereux (1989), p. 431-432.
37A similar result is provided by the solution of bilateral monopoly problem. Already
Bowley (1928) has shown that bilateral monopolists have incentives to cooperate in order
to maximize “joint profits,” i.e., to negotiate the efficient solution. Stigler (1987) suggests
that it is helpful to consider the outcome of such cooperation by analyzing a fully vertically
integrated firm, i.e., to consider the two bilateral monopolists as one vertically integrated
entity.
38In the case where the union has no bargaining power, α = 0, wfix equals RL.
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Figure 3.5: Wage and Employment Determination under the Right-to-
Manage Model with Profit-Sharing Contracts
can be lower (as depicted in Figure 3.5), higher or constant compared to a
setting without the union. This depends on the specific form of the contract
curve. Another result is that wfix must lie below wa, if u
′′
< 0. To see this,
consider that, if u
′′
< 0, the condition u
′
(y) < u
′
(x) < u
′
(w̄) for y > x > w̄
must hold. Now it can be written:
u(y) = u(w̄) +
∫ y
w̄
u
′
(x)dx > u(w̄) + (y − w̄)u′(y),
which is equivalent to
w̄ > y − u(y)− u(w̄)
u′(y)
.
Since the right-hand term of the equation above equals wfix, it follows
directly that w̄ > wfix.
To sum up the “blockbuster”clause of § 32a GCL has the potential to
foster the replication of the efficient bargain outcome within the a right-to-
manage framework. However, we cannot conclude that the usage of profit-
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sharing contracts is generally preferable to fixed compensation contracts.
In any case, § 32 and 32a GCL can be expected to cause negative effects
(see Table 3.3). Furthermore, § 32a may give rise to more inefficiencies. We
turn to such problems in the following sections.
Risk Allocation and Incentives
The “blockbuster” clause also affects the allocation of risk between producers
and creative talent, and may alter contractual incentives. We now discuss
the interplay of risk allocation and incentives in the context of moral hazard.
Chisholm (1997) suggests such an approach for the motion picture indus-
try. She presents an analysis of sharing contracts in the context of a principal-
agent framework with asymmetric information. This model assumes that a
film’s performance depends positively on the level of effort chosen by creative
talent. Creative talent is considered to engage in a positive level of effort due
to the reputation effect of performance on the expected future income stream.
However, beyond that level, an inducement to exert more effort is required
to offset the disutility of effort. The moral hazard problem here is caused
by the fact that it is virtually impossible to monitor the actual efforts of
creative talent during the production process. Creative talent such as actors
and directors always have, compared to the producer, superior information
about their choice of effort. Therefore, there always exists the possibility of
undetected shirking. In this context, sharing contracts may help to prevent
opportunistic behavior. Conversely, the use of sharing contracts may also
introduce a trade-off between efficient risk allocation and incentives.
To clarify the problem, assume first that both the principal (producer)
and the agent (e.g., the director) are risk-neutral.39 Here, the solution to
the incentive problem is trivial: the principal offers a contract to the agent
that fully insures the principal’s income and leaves the agent with all the
risk (“franchise contract”). This contract has the desirable attribute that
the agent chooses his highest level of effort. In this case, there is no trade-off
between efficient risk allocation and incentives, because neither the principal
nor the agent care about risk and all allocations of risk are efficient. The
situation changes, however, if the agent is risk-averse. Here, efficient risk
allocation is characterized by a fixed-wage contract, whereby the risk-neutral
principal bears all the risk. This gives rise to a trade-off between efficient
risk allocation and incentives: if the agent receives a secure income, he has
no incentive to increase his effort.
39The following analysis is based on the presentation of Wolfstetter (1999), Chapter 11.
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While we have no empirical knowledge about the actual risk preferences
of producers and creative talent, we may consider that they are asymmetric.
Like Chisholm (1997), we suggest that creative talent is risk-averse, while
producers are risk-neutral, because the participation of creative talent in
film production is limited at most to a few of films per year. Therefore,
the diversification of risk through a high number of projects is problematic.
In contrast, producers may engage in a many projects and diversify their
risks. In addition, human capital is difficult to diversify, because it is non-
marketable. Firms, on the other hand, have the possibility to diversify their
financial assets in capital markets.
Given these assumptions, we proceed with the help of a simple model.
Consider a risk-neutral principal, the producer, and a risk-averse agent, say,
the director. If both parties agree on a contract, the director can choose
whether he wants to perform the task with high effort ah or low effort al, with
ah > al. The level of effort is not observable to the producer. The producer
earns a random revenue Y that depends positively on the performance of the
film. If the film is a success, Y equals ys. If the film is a flop, Y equals yf .
The director’s choice of effort affects the probability distribution of Y such
that high effort action ah implies a higher probability of Y = ys. Further,
assume that the probability of a successful film Y = ys, conditional on the
director’s effort ai, is pi, i ∈ {h, l}, where 1 > ph > pl > 0. In this framework,
the expected utility of the director who signs a contract C = {ws, wf , ai} is
U(ai) = piu(ws) + (1− pi)u(wf )− c(ai),
where u(·) is a strictly concave function, ws and wf is the director’s salary
when the film is a success or failure, respectively, and c(ai) is a positive
function that represents the director’s disutility from effort. The producer’s
expected profit is
πi = pi(ys − ws) + (1− pi)(yf−wf ).
Thus, the marginal rates of substitution (MRS) between wf and ws of
the director and the producer are
dwf
dws
∣∣∣∣
U(ai)=const
=
pi
1− pi
u′(ws)
u′(wf )
,
dwf
dws
∣∣∣∣
πi=const
=
pi
1− pi
.
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Figure 3.6 illustrates some implications of that model in an Edgeworth
box diagram.
Figure 3.6: The Effect of the “Blockbuster” Clause on Risk Allocation
The agent’s indifference curves Ul and Uh represent his reservation ex-
pected utility u in a low and high effort state, respectively. The different
positions of the indifference curves arise from the differences in disutility
from effort c(ai). Likewise, the principal’s isoprofit curves are denoted as
πl and πh. The slopes of the indifference curves and of the isoprofit curves
reflect the fact that the agent’s and the principal’s MRS in the high-effort
state are higher than in the low-effort state, because ph > pl.
To assess the effects of the new GCL, we first consider the efficient allo-
cation of risk. Efficient allocation is fully characterized by three conditions.
First, the MRS of the principal and the agent are identical: only then are
further gains from a reallocation of risk impossible. Since agents are as-
sumed to be risk-averse, all efficient allocations must lie on the “fixed-wage
contracts” line, because only there the agent’s income is fully secure (imply-
ing that ws = wf ). Second, the agent’s reservation expected utility level u
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must be reached or he will reject the contract. Third, the principal’s expected
profits are maximized. In Figure 3.6, expected profits can be read from the
intersection of the principal’s isoprofit curves with the “franchise contracts”
line.
Obviously, point A represents an efficient allocation of risk: the principal’s
expected profits are maximized (πh), the agent’s utility level is u and both
principal and agent have the same MRS. In A, the principal offers a pure
fixed-wage contract to the agent that requires high-level effort ah. However,
full income insurance leads to the moral hazard problem. As the agent’s
effort is not observable, he might shirk and choose the low effort al. In this
case, full income insurance would lead to a situation represented by point
B. Although the agent still reaches u, the principal’s profits fall from πh to
πl. This is inefficient. The principal now may offer an incentive contract to
the agent to achieve a higher level of profit. Since the agent is risk-averse,
this inevitably constitutes the trade-off between efficient risk allocation and
incentives. Nevertheless, second-best allocations are still obtainable. Point
A
′
represents the outcome of a second-best contract. This contract has the
desirable characteristic that the agent is indifferent between exerting high or
low effort, and the principal may implement the high-level action. In A
′
, the
principal reaches his second best profit level π
′
h by implementing a sharing
contract.
Now consider the effects of imposing a “minimum-sharing” provision as
demanded by § 32a GCL. Obviously, if the provision is not binding A
′
would
still be realized. In contrast, a binding “minimum-sharing” provision as
indicated in Figure 3.6 leads to a less efficient allocation of risk. In this
case, A
′
is no longer feasible. The principal offers a contract to the agent
that maximizes expected profits subject to the “minimum-sharing” provision.
That contract is represented by A
′′
and gives (compared to A
′
) the following
changes:
First, expected profits are lower, because π
′
l > π
′′
l . Second, if the movie
is a flop, the agent’s wage is lower. In the case of success, the agent’s wage
is higher.40 Third, A
′′
represents a less-than-second-best efficient allocation
of risk, because risk has been “shifted” from the risk-neutral principal to the
risk-averse agent. This contradicts the legislative intent of the new GCL,
40The effect of the new GCL on the allocation of risk may also imply a redistributive
aspect between different types of agents. From an ex post perspective, creative talent
attached to more successful projects may receive higher incomes, while creative talent
attached to failures may earn less income under the new legislation. This holds, if the
number of projects that the average creative employee realizes is sufficiently small and the
distribution of the projects performance is sufficiently skewed.
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which seeks to prevent a shifting of risk from producers to creative talent.
Overall, A
′′
represents an allocation of risk that is less efficient than the
second-best contract.
Note that A is not the only first-best efficient contract within the frame-
work of the model presented here. For instance, if the differences in probabil-
ities ph and pl become smaller, or if the parameter gs is assumed to decrease,
a contract which requires only a low level of effort al from the agent – similar
to that represented by B – could also be offered to the agent. Indeed, all
parameter constellations that imply πl > πh would induce the principal to
offer a “fixed-wage” contract that in turn induces the agent to choose the
low-effort action al. Nevertheless, the introduction of a “minimum-sharing”
provision would cause analogous effects to the incentive contract case dis-
cussed above, and, in particular, risk-shifting on creative talent and lower
profits. The reason is that efficient “fixed-wage” contracts are impossible to
realize when the “blockbuster” clause is applied.
Further, the introduction of the “minimum-sharing” provision may also
give a result where low-effort contracts are exchanged for high-effort con-
tracts. Here, the necessary compensation paid to creative talent for the
legally induced risk-taking is larger than the compensation necessary to in-
duce creative talent to choose the high-effort action ah. Therefore, 32a GCL
could also lead to more contracts that induce high effort.
There is yet another incentive effect of the “blockbuster” clause, i.e., the
effect of the new law on producers’ incentives to promote the sale of the films
they produce.41 For instance, such promotional activities include efforts to
sell a film on the international market. Whether the legally forced intro-
duction of sharing contracts affects such promotional activities will depend
on the definition of the “shared” pool. If the pool consists of profits, there
will be no distortion. The argument is analogous to the standard neutral-
ity argument concerning the effects of profit taxes on the firm’s decisions.
Profit-sharing does not affect the producers’ marginal decisions on promo-
tional effort. Maximizing the “pool” is still optimal. On the other hand,
if collective remuneration schemes base on revenues or alternative “pools”
that are different from the firm’s profits, then promotional activities will be
affected, because the producer bears all the cost of promotion, but receives
only a fraction of the associated revenues. Therefore, the expected return
from investing into film promotion may decline under the new legislation.
41The promotional activity effect is analyzed in the context of the droit de suite by Karp
and Perloff (1993).
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Transaction Costs
The “blockbuster” clause effectively turns fixed payment contracts into share
payment contracts. This affects the transaction costs of contracting, because
the cost of share and fixed payment contracts differ. In the case of the
motion picture industry, fixed payment contracts are typically standardized
forms that require simple information such as the working title of the film,
the name of the producer, and payment of the creative talent.42 In general,
the marginal cost of drafting, monitoring, and enforcing the contract is small.
On the other hand, share payment contracts could imply significant trans-
action costs. Imagine, say, that a director’s compensation is tied to the rev-
enue of a film. First, defining the contract can be costly. What sources
of revenues should be included? Do revenues include theatrical revenues,
revenues from pay-TV and free-TV, DVD, video, in-flight entertainment,
merchandising, foreign markets? Should the director’s payment vary with
reruns on television? Second, disclosure obligations have to be negotiated
to enable the contractual parties to monitor the film’s success. Such moni-
toring is also costly. Ultimately, the director or a representative may have
to control the books of the producer. Third, administrative costs with re-
spect to the recording and the disclosure of respective data will be created.
Things get even more complicated where profits, and not revenues, are used
as the relevant pool of share payments; should costs include production costs
only or are distribution expenses also included? Do production costs include
overbudget penalties? Do distribution expenses include transportation in-
surance, etc.? Fourth, law enforcement costs, i.e., costs of litigation may also
be generated.43
Which party will bear the cost? One way to consider this question is
42See Chisholm (1997) and Weinstein (1998) for detailed descriptions of contracting
practices in the US film industry.
43Germany has several trustee organizations that administer the exploitation rights of
creative talent. For instance, GEMA, the Gesellschaft für musikalische Aufführungs- und
mechanische Vervielfältigungsrechte (The society for musical performing and mechanical
reproduction rights) passes on royalty payments to originators. One might suspect that
these organizations could offer their infrastructure to help to reduce transaction costs from
sharing contracts. However, since § 32a GCL allows individual legal claims to change ex-
isting contracts it seems unlikely that these organizations will actually collect associated
ex post payments. Statements in personal conversations with representatives of these orga-
nizations support that presumption. Nevertheless, one should not exclude the possibility
that future collective remuneration schemes may include such cooperation. Provided that
these organizations play a role in monitoring or collecting royalties, there would still be
transaction costs, since new types of revenues, e.g., from selling foreign theatrical rights
of a film, would have to be implemented by these organizations.
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to treat legally induced transaction costs as a tax. In general, the answer
to this question then depends on the price elasticities of labor demand and
supply. The party with the lower elasticity will bear the larger share of
that cost.44 Moreover, under the reasonable assumption that infinite and
zero price elasticities can be excluded, both parties will have to bear the
artificially increased transaction costs of contracting.
To sum up, significant transaction costs can be expected from compliance
with the “blockbuster” clause.
3.3.4 Effects of Other Prescriptions
Apart from the two main prescriptions discussed so far, the new GCL also
gives rise to vagueness that may cause legal uncertainty. Since legal certainty
enables economic transactions, legal uncertainty may hinder transactions and
may increase incentives to move to other jurisdictions with greater legal cer-
tainty. Against that background, we briefly consider two issues: uncertainty
attached to the definition of “appropriate” compensation and uncertainty
linked to the extended scope of addressees under the new GCL.
Following the wording of § 36 I GCL, “associations of originators” and
“associations of producers” shall be legally qualified to conclude agreements
on remuneration schemes. It remains unclear what exactly qualifies these
associations. § 36 II GCL seeks to clarify the situation by stating that asso-
ciations must be “representative,” “independent,” and “empowered,” but it
is far from obvious what these adjectives actually mean. Moreover, it is pos-
sible that more than one association could be qualified to conclude collective
remuneration schemes. Therefore, rival remuneration schemes may be nego-
tiated. The question than arises as to which scheme is relevant for defining
appropriate compensation. While § 32 I GCL states that collective bargain-
ing contracts (Tarifverträge) dominate collective remuneration schemes, it
remains an open question which collective wage agreements provide a reli-
able benchmark and whether any relevant collective wage agreements exist.
Therefore, legal uncertainty is introduced by the law.
Further, § 36 III, IV GCL and § 36a GCL prescribe conciliation proceed-
ings proposed by a mediator (Schlichtungsverfahren) to specify appropriate-
ness when (i) both parties wish such procedure, or (ii) when one party de-
mands such procedure.45 The arbitration board then suggests an agreement
44For an analysis of tax incidence in a partial equilibrium model, see Musgrave and
Musgrave (1989). A general equilibrium approach is presented by Harberger (1962).
45Provided that the other party has not started to negotiate within three months, or,
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to the parties. If this agreement is not accepted, the parties may take legal
action. In this case, the courts have to decide on the appropriate – or “just”
to use Däubler-Gmelin’s term – price of creative work. At this point, we can
only speculate about the likelihood as to the legal uncertainty introduced, be-
cause the courts’ definition or definitions of “appropriate” compensation can
hardly be predicted. Consider, for example, that judges will have to assess
the factors to define a “just” price such, risk bearing, costs, and revenues. In
addition, judges may choose from a variety of ethical standards such as those
proposed by Bentham, Rousseau, Marx, and Rawls, which imply differing
concepts of justice.46
Finally, due to § 75 IV GCL, the central prescriptions § 32 and § 32a
GCL apply to performing artists. Under § 73 GCL, a performing artist is
“who recites or performs an opus or who artistically plays a part in reciting
or performing an opus.”47 Therefore, the new GCL, compared to previous
regulations, gives a broad definition of addressees. With respect to the pro-
duction of motion pictures, originators with legal claims for “appropriate”
compensation potentially include many of the participants. For instance, the
director, the director of photography, the editor, the sound editor, actors, the
production designer, the art director, the costume designer, and the screen-
writer. This may cause legal uncertainty, because it seems rather difficult to
define rules that stipulate which creative worker accounts for a given amount
of creative merit. The production of every film is different. Sometimes the
director may provide the driving creative force of a project, sometimes the
screen-writer contributes the chief creative ingredient and sometimes this role
is played by an actor. Presently, it is an open question as to who exactly will
be entitled to receive “appropriate” compensation.
This is also important with respect to new exploitation methods. Accord-
ing to § 31 IV GCL, which was not amended, contracts between originators
and users may only refer to known exploitation methods. Therefore, if new
opportunities of exploitation emerge, new contracts have to be concluded.
This has been the case in the past with respect to the introduction of video,
DVD, and internet-based exploitation. Such new contracting becomes more
difficult, however, when the range of addressees increases. Therefore, the
introduction of new exploitation methods may be hindered by these recent
changes in copyright law. This may only be limited by § 75 GCL, which
prescribes, that performing artists may elect a single representative to assert
one year of negotiations has not produced results, or, finally, one of the parties states
unequivocally that the negotiations have failed.
46See e.g., Musgrave and Musgrave (1989) for a brief description of these concepts.
47Author’s translation.
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their claim from § 32, 32a GCL.
3.4 Conclusion
The main motivation for the amendment package to Germany’s Copyright
Law, the “act to enhance the contractual status of authors and performers”
is based on redistributive arguments derived from an ad hoc presumption
by legislators as to the existence of a “structural superiority” of producers
against their creative contractual counterparts.
Our analysis of the economic effects of the new GCL reveals two things.
First, it is implausible to presume that there exists buyer power in the Ger-
man motion picture industry, so the changes to copyright law are based on
a misleading presumption. Second, the redistribution of income toward cre-
ative talent under the new law is likely to generate economic inefficiencies.
This implies that the “price” of redistribution of income for the benefit of
some members of the pool of creative talent is higher than the gains.
More specifically, our analysis shows that the legally fostered application
of collective remuneration schemes under § 32 and § 36 GCL can be expected
to cause inefficient employment levels in relevant labor markets. Further,
German producers overall will realize lower profits, due to several effects,
i.e., the redistribution of income via collective remuneration schemes, the
distortion of efficient risk allocation triggered by the “blockbuster” clause
32a GCL, an increase in associated transaction costs, and reduced incentives
for producers to promote their films. In addition, legal uncertainty with
respect to the definition of “appropriate” compensation and concerning the
extended scope of addressees of the GCL may adversely affect producers.
It is important to note that, despite the potentially higher levels of wages
and total worker remuneration, creative talent may also be hurt by the new
law. First, § 32a GCL contradicts the legislative objective of lowering orig-
inator risk by actually shifting risk onto them by lowering the secure part
of their income. Second, creative talent can be expected to bear a share of
the rising transaction costs associated to the new rules. Third, the amended
GCL may reduce employment levels in the industry. Thus, while employed
workers gain higher wages, others are no longer employed. This effect de-
pends on the specific model of union behavior suited to the market. However,
it is clear that lower producers’ profits and legal uncertainty will increase in-
centives to produce film outside of the scope of the GCL. This inevitably will
adversely affects the economic well-being of creative labor.
Chapter 4
Convergence and the Potential
Ban on Interactive Product
Placement
4.1 Introduction
Digital technology permits the use of devices such as personal computers and
television for similar functions. This digital “convergence” also makes it pos-
sible to provide consumers with interactive services. Until quite recently the
term “interactivity” was little more than a buzzword. In the case of television
broadcasting, for instance, it simply meant selecting programs or choosing
teletext pages. Viewers wishing to interact further had to communicate with
broadcasters or advertisers by email, telephone, or letters. Industry observers
report this situation is about to change dramatically,1 with the introduction
of enhanced television devices (e.g., set-top boxes) that allow viewers to in-
teract directly with web-based information.2 In practical terms, viewers will
be able to use their remote controls to purchase goods associated with the
broadcast without having to go online with their personal computer. The
1See Blickpunkt:Film (2001) Interaktives TV mit analogem Fernsehen, No. 13., p.
43; Berger, R. (2000) T-Commerce could dwarf web sales, Electronic Media, November
6, 2000, and McDonald, K.A (2001) Advertisers test interactive arena, Variety, January
15-21, 2001 (Section: spotlight television).
2A number of television set manufacturers already offer television devices with internet
access, e.g., Fujitsu Siemens Computers (Activy 300), Grundig (WB1), Loewe (Xelos
@media TV), and Commodore (Web.it ). There have been trials and tests of interactive
television since the 1970s. For a review of the history of interactive television trials and
experiences, see Carey (1997).
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change opens up possibilities for advertisers, not only in traditional spot
advertising, but also in connection with products appearing within regular
programing. Putting products directly into a program or film is referred to as
“product placement” or “brand placement.” Product placement is currently
used as a means to help finance movies and TV programs.3
The combination of interactivity and product placement could alter the
market for product placement considerably. First, it is likely to enlarge
the market substantially and, hence, raise its weight in program financing.
Traditional product placement is limited to branded products, i.e., prod-
ucts already familiar to the viewer. Interactive product placement (IPP) in
contrast is useful in building brands, because it makes any placed product in-
teractively identifiable and easy to buy.4 Second, the commercial possibilities
of IPP will likely motivate development of new products by the audiovisual
and telecommunications industries, and in the case of television, foster the
development of new content formats and services as well.
In Germany, as elsewhere in Europe, however, advertising regulations –
above all, the principle of separation between programmingand advertising
– constitute major impediments to the deployment of IPP. Further, the po-
litical discussion seems very much concerned with the desirability of such
advertising methods.5
Thus, several questions arise. What specific regulations apply to IPP?
Will IPP be banned? Which arguments might favor IPP and what legal
counterarguments support a ban? How would the introduction of IPP affect
economic welfare? We address these questions in the following discussion.
Our focus lies on the application of IPP to motion pictures.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 identifies
the legal framework of IPP in Germany.6 Section 4.3 critically reviews that
framework and explores some of its economic dimensions. In this context, a
3For examples from the US, see Snyder (1992). German cases are described by Auer,
Kalweit, and Nüßler (1991).
4Digitalization also allows for new types of product placement. In a 1999 episode of a
US soap opera, a technology that allows advertisers to have products digitally added to a
scene was tested. That technology was subsequently used in sports broadcasts to add or
change content of commercial billboard areas seen during baseball and football games.
5This scepticism is well illustrated by a recent announcement of the Commission of
the European Communities of its intention to study new television advertising techniques,
in particular with regard to interactivity and product placement. The main focus of the
study is “...to analyze how to ensure a clear distinction between advertising and other
content.” See Commission of the European Communities (1999), p. 17.
6The focus of the legal analysis here is the German framework, which serves as a fair
representation of the regulatory environment found in much of Europe.
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brief description of the US legal framework is provided. Section 4.4 presents
a simple equilibrium model that permits a welfare economic analysis of a ban
on IPP. Section 4.5 summarizes the main findings and concludes.
4.2 Legal Framework
German advertising regulations are complex and differ extensively with re-
spect to media and services. In the following, we seek to examine regulations
potentially relevant to IPP. First, we turn to the field of television broad-
casting and briefly consider the established principle of separation of regular
programmingand advertising and its relation to surreptitious advertising, as
well as regulations and guidelines concerning specific classifications of ad-
vertising such as “teleshopping,” “long time advertising” (Dauerwerbung),
and “prop & wardrobe credits, and accompanying items” (Ausstatterhin-
weise, Begleitmaterial). Second, we discuss regulations that apply to movies
that are initially produced for theatrical release. Third, we look at so called
teleservices. Then, we consider the Deutsche Grundgesetz (German Basic
Law), and specifically, the rulings of the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal
Constitutional Court - BVerfG) which provide the legal basis for the current
framework for advertising legislation. We take these constitutional interpre-
tations into account in a critique of the current design of the legal framework.
4.2.1 Television Broadcasting
General Regulations
Advertising regulations in the field of television broadcasting can be found at
three levels. At the highest level, there are EU directives that provide supra-
national guidelines.7 Within Germany, the Rundfunkstaatsvertrag (RStV)
governs broadcasting at the interstate level.8 Finally, there is specific media
7Council Directive 89/552/EEC 03/10/1989. Official Journal L 298, 17/10/1989, mod-
ified by 97/36/EC, Official Journal L 202, 30/07/1997 and the European Convention on
Transfrontier Television, 05/05/1989.
8Rundfunkstaatsvertrag vom 31. August in der Fassung des vierten Rund-
funkänderungsstaatsvertrags, in Kraft seit dem 1. April 2000, GBl., Baden-Württemberg
vom 30.12.1999. The Bundesverfassungsgericht in its very first judgement on television
broadcasting in 1961 ruled that broadcasting legislation is, in principle, subject to the
jurisdiction of the states. See Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE]
[Federal Constitutional Court] 12, 205 ff. (F.R.G.) Therefore, interstate agreements simi-
lar to multilateral agreements under international law emerged alongside law at the federal
4.2. Legal Framework 65
regulation at the state level. Besides, there are television advertising guide-
lines issued by the public television stations and a special authority of the
federal states, the Direktorenkonferenz der Landesmedienanstalten (DLM),
which deals with advertising regulations in detail.9
For our purposes, it is at first sufficient to discuss the RStV as it is the
primary source of regulations governing German television advertising. At
the heart of these regulations lies the principle of separating advertising from
other programing. This notion may well be considered the great dictum of
German broadcasting advertising law.10 The principle is spelled out in § 7
III RStV:
“Advertising and teleshopping must be clearly identifiable as such.
They have to be separated unequivocally from other programing, by
optical means in the case of television and by acoustic means in the
case of radio.”11
A violation of the separation principle may lead to television broadcasting
law complaints and can be prosecuted as a regulatory offense. Of course, it
is problematic to apply the separation principle strictly – advertisements
and brand name products are ubiquitous parts of everyday life. Therefore, a
program that does not display advertisements and brand names does not give
an authentic picture of reality. Moreover, it would be impossible to broadcast
reports about products. Consequently, it is beyond legal dispute that some
usage of brand name products and the filming of advertisements within the
scope of programming is tolerable.12 The distinction between admissible
and prohibited product presentations is provided by the term surreptitious
advertising defined in § 2 II No. 6 RStV:
“Surreptitious advertising is the reference to or the presentation
of goods, services, names, trademarks or activities of a manufacturer
of goods or a supplier of services in programs when such reference
or presentation is intended by the broadcaster to serve advertising
purposes and can mislead the general public as to its real purpose.”13
level.
9The DLM consists of representatives from each state’s broadcasting authority. The
DLM seeks to coordinate the licensing of federal broadcasting, efforts involving protection
of children and young persons against immoral influences, and the setting of advertising
guidelines.
10See Engels and Giebel (2000), p. 271.
11Author’s translation.
12See Platho (2000), p. 48.
13Author’s translation.
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The ban on surreptitious advertising is expressed in § 7 VI RStV. Infringe-
ments against this ban can result in a regulatory fine and the confiscation of
revenues generated by surreptitious advertising (§ 49 I RStV).14
We can see that there are two elements to the definition of surreptitious
advertising: the broadcaster’s intent to advertise and the potential for viewer
deception. With respect to the broadcaster’s intent to advertise, section § 2
II No. 6 RStV explicitly enumerates broadcasters receiving a payment or a
similar valuable monetary consideration for product presentation. Further-
more, the legal literature suggests compulsory indication of the advertising’s
intent where contractual obligations with respect to a product placement
exist or if the screenplay has been adjusted accordingly.15 Therefore, there
is a strong likelihood IPP will be classed as surreptitious advertising under
existing television broadcasting law. With respect to IPP’s potential for
viewer deception, the RStV is silent. However, several rulings and discussion
in the legal literature indicate that traditional product placement is widely
considered as potentially deceptive.16 This perception is further supported
by other provisions of the RStV such as § 7 II RStV, which bans advertisers
and advertisements from having any influence on programming content or
editorial decisions.
Specific Regulations
The border between illegal surreptitious advertising and pure product presen-
tations is blurred. Legal practices, legislation, and broadcasting authorities
have therefore created narrower definitions for making the necessary distinc-
tions. Let us briefly explore the most relevant terms with respect to their
applicability to IPP.
14Regulatory fines run as high as ¿ 510,000. § 7 III RStV also reveals that the fulfillment
of the separation principle requires a clear identification of advertising. Basically, this
means that advertising has to be readily recognizable as such, for example, by displaying
the caption “advertising” on screen. Such identification is sufficient if it is displayed for
several seconds at the beginning of a block of commercials.
15However, the broadcaster’s intent is generally not considered with respect to the broad-
cast of pure licensing products, e.g., foreign movies or sport events that contain product
placement. In such cases, broadcasters will not be held liable. See e.g., Engels and Giebel
(2000), p. 278. We return to this matter later in the paper.
16See BGH “Boro” decision, I ZR 78/88 of 22.02. 1990 and Hartstein, Kreile, and Ring
(1999).
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 Teleshopping
First, one might assume that IPP constitutes one of several permit-
ted types of “teleshopping” and, hence, could be classified as legitimate.
Teleshopping is generally defined in § 2 II No. 8 RStV as a broadcast that
directly offers goods and services to the public. On the other hand, the RStV
says teleshopping is subject to the separation principle of § 7 III RStV. Thus,
IPP will probably not be classed as a type of teleshopping under the RStV.
Second, “teleshopping channels” are not regulated by the RStV, but by
the Mediendienstestaatsvertrag (MDStV), an inter-state agreement on media
services. Such channels operate for the limited purpose of selling products to
their viewers. While one might logically presume that movies that contain
IPP could simply be transmitted via a pure teleshopping channel, § 9 II MD-
StV states that the “advertising must be clearly identifiable as such and has
to be separated unequivocally from other content of the services.”17 Again,
the separation principle is reflected in this provision, which suggests that
even on the teleshopping channel, which exists expressly to sell products, it
is likely illegal to show a movie that contains IPP.
 Long time advertising (Dauerwerbung)
Another type of permitted advertising that might be relevant with respect
to IPP is “long time advertising.” The classification applies to infomercial-
type ads. Typically, such advertising is packaged as demonstrations, testimo-
nials, or game show formats. Although, the law offers no explicit definition
of such advertising, it is characterized by a combination of advertising and
editorial parts of product presentations addressed under § 7 V RStV. The
advertising elements must dominate the presentation to ensure that the sep-
aration principle is followed, and the presentation must display writing that
clearly indicates that the purpose of the presentation is to sell a product.18
Again, although one might expect convergence to enlarge the market for such
presentations, IPP does not necessarily fit the term because it will not neces-
sarily come to the fore in a broadcast. While some interactive presentations
may largely be sales events, the sales intention embedded with a movie is only
incidental. Again, IPP in movies will likely be banned, because it violates
the separation principle.
17Author’s translation.
18See Engels and Giebel (2000).
4.2. Legal Framework 68
 Prop & wardrobe credits, accompanying items (Ausstatterhinweise, Be-
gleitmaterial)
Further, the “prop and wardrobe credits” view could be considered to
apply to IPP. In exchange for prop and wardrobe credits, producers of goods
such as furnishing and clothing make their products available at no cost to
movie or television show producers. In return, the product manufacturers are
mentioned in the end credits by the broadcaster. This approach is not banned
according to No. 19 DLM television guidelines. Naming products within
the program, however, is forbidden. The same holds for accompagnying
items that are intended to deepen the editorial content of a broadcast, e.g.,
a companion book to the film.19 Moreover, money paid to use a prop is
generally considered to constitute surreptitious advertising. Thus, also due
to its financing function it is unlikely that IPP will be classified as a legitimate
means of showing prop credits.
4.2.2 Theatrical Releases
IPP seems unlikely to occur in movie theatres. Nevertheless, it is reason-
able to discuss traditional product placement in films, because the analysis
here provides insight into the legal discussion of this advertising method.
With respect to movies produced for theatrical release, competition law, in
particular, the Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb (Act Against Un-
fair Competition - UWG) contains provisions potentially relevant to product
placement. § 1 UWG, a universal civil blanket clause, has been invoked by
the courts in resolving previous litigation:20
“Whosoever in business dealings for the purpose of competition
takes up practices that offend against good morals may be called upon
to cease and compensate for damages”21
19See Engels and Giebel (2000).
20§ 3 UWG, which bans deceptive advertising, may also be somewhat relevant. However,
§ 3 UWG sets broader limits than § 1 UWG. For an extensive discussion of product
placement in the context of competition law, see Asche (1996), p. 52 ff.
21Author’s translation. Apart from the legal consequences enumerated in § 1 UWG,
a contract that offends good morals will void the contract and make it unenforceable.
A prominent German example of a voided product placement contract was seen in the
case of a textile firm’s advance payment of DEM 200,000 (approximately ¿ 102.500) for
a product placement in the popular music telecast “Formel 1.” Although the placement
never actually appeared, the firm’s attempt to recover its advance payment was not heard
by the regional court, because the court said the contract offended good morals. See
Scheele (1986), p. 28, for this and other examples.
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The legal literature on this matter states that the potential harm of prod-
uct placement is covered by two areas of the law: consumer deception (fraud)
and rule infringement.22 With respect to consumer deception, it is argued
that product placement may be used as a means to circumvent natural con-
sumer skepticism about advertising. When consumers are not in a position
to deal critically with the product appearance, the product placement is seen
as an act contra bonos mores. Similarly, with respect to rule infringement, it
is argued that product placement gives the advertiser a competitive advan-
tage over its law-abiding business rivals and is a violation of the separation
principle and other RStV prescriptions.
Recently, the German Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court - BGH) con-
sidered product placement in detail with respect to the theatrical showing of
the movie Feuer, Eis und Dynamit.23 The court’s decision found that it is
reasonable to assume an audience will not be deceived by product placement
as long as the amount of product placement in a motion picture is no more
than “generally expected” and kept to a “tolerable” level. In addition, the
BGH demanded that the audience be informed about product placement.
Subsequent legal writings have considered product placement in the con-
text of motion picture production for initial theatrical release legal as long as
the product placement is announced to the audience.24 This view contrast
sharply with the rules concerning IPP in television broadcasting.
4.2.3 Tele-Services
The federal Teledienstegesetz (TDG) law governs electronic telecommunica-
tions services for personal use, e.g., internet use. Under this law, no sepa-
ration of advertising and other content is necessary. The TDG clearly al-
lows IPP as part of telecommunications services provided to individuals and
clearly contradicts the regulation of IPP in television broadcasting.
To sum up, our analysis suggests that the regulation of IPP differs in
accordance with the medium. IPP seems likely to be prohibited in television
broadcasting, permitted on a limited basis in movies primarily produced for
22See Asche (1996).
23BGH, 06.07.1995, in: Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1995, p. 3177 ff. and BGH,
06.07.1995, in: Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1995, p. 3182 f., for discussion, see Asche
(1996), p. 72 ff.
24A narrower evaluation of the BGH ruling is given by Hartstein, Kreile, and Ring
(1999), p. 60. Product placement is considered legal when no more than 20% of the
movie’s financing stem from product placement. If this limit is exceeded, the use of paid
product placement must be announced to the audience before the movie is shown.
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theatrical release (as long as the amount of IPP is tolerable and announced),
and permitted without restriction in electronic telecommunications services
provided to individuals.
4.2.4 Constitutional Issues
German Basic Law provides the legal basis for television broadcasting regula-
tions, competition law, and teleservices provisions. Therefore, an analysis of
constitutional aspects of IPP and traditional product placement may clarify
the underlying reasoning behind the differences in regulation depending on
media type.
With respect to competition law, German Basic Law can be used as a
guideline for interpretation of the civil blanket clause of § 1 UWG.25 The
literature suggests that from this perspective product placement ultimately
has to be judged as a balancing of artistic freedom as specified in Art. 5 III
phrase 1 Basic Law and consumers’ right to autonomously contract stated
in Art. 2 I Basic Law.26 The latter right implies that consumers have the
right to decide autonomously if they want to contract, with whom, how, and
what subject matter the contract might contain. However, to be in a position
to decide autonomously it is necessary that consumers can deal freely with
product advertisements. If a consumer is unaware that a product in a movie is
part of a product advertising campaign, he or she might view the advertising
message uncritically. Therefore, product placement can be considered to
disturb the consumer’s free decision of purchasing. Consequently, one faces
a trade-off between the freedom of art and the personal rights of Art. 2 Basic
Law, i.e., a trade-off between artistic freedom and consumers’ autonomy to
contract.
With respect to the field of broadcasting, essentially Art. 5 I phrase 2
Basic Law has to be considered. It states,
25The BGH argued for such interpretation in the Feuer, Eis und Dynamit case. Basic
constitutional rights, in principle, govern relations between citizens and the state, but they
may also be used as guidelines for interpretation of civil blanket clauses. See BVerfGE 73,
261 (269) (F.R.G.).
26Other German Basic Law provisions that protect product placement are the freedom
to freely choose one’s profession (Art. 12 I phrase 1) and the freedom of opinion (Art. 5 I
phrase 1). However, the freedom of artistic expression (Art. 5 III) rules these provisions
out. On the other hand, viewers’ interest in undisturbed movie viewing could also be
deduced from the general freedom of action Art. 2 I Basic Law. However, since viewer
decide herself to watch or not to watch a movie, it is implausible to refer to this provision.
For an extensive discussion of this issue see Asche (1996), p. 95 ff.
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“Freedom of the press and freedom of reporting by means of broad-
casts and movies shall be guaranteed.”27
While one might expect this provision supports the broadcaster’s freedom
to choose whether to broadcast product placements, the juridical interpre-
tation is quite the opposite. The key to this surprising interpretation lies
in a number of seminal decisions by the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal
Constitutional Court - BVerfG). These serve as reference points for all tele-
vision broadcasting regulations.28 Traditionally, the ruling of the BVerfG
has stated that the freedom of broadcasting must serve primarily as a means
to ensure the process of free and comprehensive formation of personal and
public opinion, which is considered essential in a pluralist democratic so-
ciety. Therefore, the freedom to broadcast and report freely is considered
to represent an institutional guarantee, rather than a basic right to pursue
one’s own interests.29 Moreover, the BVerfG considers television broadcast-
ing, due to its scope and suggestive power, to be of special importance in the
process of opinion building.30 The essential role of television broadcasting
also extends beyond information dissemination and political broadcasting to
the field of entertainment.31 In this context, the separation principle can be
considered to protect the “market for opinions” within society.32 Any direct
or indirect influence on programming is considered to be incompatible with
this protective function.33 Hence, television broadcasting legislation consid-
ers the separation principle to be a means to protect the function of free
and comprehensive formation of opinions by the individual and the public at
large.
4.3 Critical Review
We have seen so far that juridical arguments supporting a ban on IPP are
essentially based on two grounds. First, following the traditional television
27Translation from Steiner (1996), p. 129.
28So far there have been eight decisions. These “broadcasting decisions” are milestones
in the interpretation of German broadcasting law: BVerfGE 12, 205 ff. (F.R.G.); 31, 314
ff. (F.R.G.); 57, 295 ff. (F.R.G.); 73, 118 ff. (F.R.G.); 74, 297 ff. (F.R.G.), 83, 238 ff.
(F.R.G.); 87, 181 ff. and 90, 60 ff. (F.R.G.).
29BVerfGE 57, 295, 320 (F.R.G.) and BVerfGE 87, 181, 197 (F.R.G.).
30BVerFGE 90, 60 (87) (F.R.G.).
31BVerfGE 90, 60 (87) (F.R.G.).
32See BVerfGE 57, 295 (323) (F.R.G.), regarding the term “market for opinions” (Mei-
nungsmarkt).
33BVerfGE 90, 60 (87) (F.R.G.).
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broadcasting model of the BVerfG, the ban protects the institutional guar-
antee of a free “market for opinions.” Second, the ban attempts to protect
viewers from deception that could occur if products appear unannounced in
a broadcast. We next question whether these arguments are necessarily suf-
ficient to justify a total ban on IPP and consider the problems that could
arise from a ban on IPP.
4.3.1 The “Market for Opinions”
Lets start out with a potential economic argument in favor of a ban on
IPP. With respect to the protection of the “market for opinions” Akerlof’s
“market for lemons” (Akerlof (1970)) might be addressed. If IPP is assumed
to reduce program quality, and quality cannot be observed by viewers (but
by broadcasters), the market for programs may work inefficiently or even
break down. The reason is that with IPP broadcasters have less incentives
to show programs without IPP, because IPP rewards them with additional
revenue. Thus, the market adversely selects by substituting programs with
IPP for programs without IPP. The “market for opinions” becomes biased
towards motion pictures containing IPP. As this problem arises from the
informational asymmetry between broadcasters and viewers, the introduction
of a simple obligation to inform viewers about IPP may resolve it. Thus, a
simple policy measure can create symmetric information so that there is no
“market for lemons”-problem in the “market for opinions.” Note that to
the extent the announcement fails to inform viewers, e.g., because viewers
may forget or ignore the announcement, a bias towards IPP movies remains
possible. However, with respect to IPP broadcasters have strong incentives to
make sure that viewers are informed, because they want viewers to “click” on
IPP products. This constitutes a contrast to traditional product placement.
Thus, overall a ban on IPP in order to prevent a “market for lemons” problem
seems misguided.
Other arguments against a ban can also be suggested. First, we should
remember television broadcasting is only part of the “market for opinions.”
This market also includes radio, newspapers, books, personal conversations,
and increasingly the internet.34 Therefore, the “scope and suggestive power”
of television broadcasting as suggested by the BVerfG is decreasing. Second,
34The potential of the internet as a tool for political organization is often recognized in
public debate with respect to non-governmental organizations, and, in a negative context,
e.g., with respect to extremist groups. Moreover, questionnaires indicate that 34% of
internet users state that they watch less TV due to internet use (See Media Perspektiven,
No. 8, 2001, p. 389).
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it seems unlikely that movies as escapist entertainment are as important in
building public and personal opinion as informative programs such as news,
current events analysis, or documentaries. Third, movies exist in enormous
diversity. In Germany, viewers can choose between 46 television channels
with a nationwide license, and many foreign stations available via satellite.35
In 1998, 10,864 different movies were broadcast on 21,492 occasions.36 Thus,
viewers had access to over 29 movies a day. Given this enormous variety and
the demanding tastes of audiences,37 it seems implausible to argue IPP would
significantly restrict the process of opinion building. Fourth, the “market
of opinions” is protected by various television broadcasting provisions that
supplement general competition law. For instance, the RStV prescribes that
private television broadcasting groups that reach more than 10% of view-
ers on an annual average have to provide transmission time for independent
third parties. Broadcasting groups that reach on average more than 30% of
viewers have to sell stakes of related media companies or, alternatively, have
to provide transmission time for independent third parties and have to set
up an “advisory program council” that consists of members that represent
the spectrum of opinions within society. The council then has various in-
formational rights and changes of the program scheme have to be approved
by the council (see RStV §§ 25-32).38 Fifth, public television broadcasters
(which still reach, by far, the largest average share of viewers) are obliged to
provide programs that represent a variety of opinions.
We conclude it is implausible to suggest that IPP will endanger the “mar-
ket for opinions.”
4.3.2 Viewer Deception and Confusion
With respect to viewer autonomy, the Feuer, Eis und Dynamit ruling of the
BGH suggested that deception of viewers can be prevented as long as the
35See Kommission Zur Ermittlung der Konzentration Im Medienbereich - KEK (2000)
- (Commission for the investgation of media concentration - KEK).
36Kommission Zur Ermittlung der Konzentration Im Medienbereich - KEK (2000), p.
26.
37See e.g., De Vany and Walls (1999) and Chapter 2 of this work.
38Up to now there have been no private television broadcasting-groups that reach more
than 30 per cent viewer share. The two obvious candidates, Kirch Group and RTL Group,
reach about 25 to 28 per cent average viewer share. See Kommission Zur Ermittlung der
Konzentration Im Medienbereich - KEK (2000), p. 24. Due to the insolvency of parts
of the Kirch Group in early 2002 the market structure is likely to change in the future.
However, so far it remains an open question how the insolvency will affect the market
structure.
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audience is reasonably forewarned of the product placement. We argue, as
above, that this consideration could also be applied to the field of television
broadcasting. The deception of television viewers could easily be avoided by
obliging broadcasters to announce that the broadcast movie contains IPP. For
instance, such an announcement could be realized by a simple symbol that
appears on the screen during the transmission of a movie that contains IPP.
This solution would be similar to teleshopping and long time advertisement
regulations and should reasonably prevent deception of viewers. Moreover, as
stated above, even without an obligation, broadcasters have strong incentives
to announce IPP voluntarily, because they want viewers to “click” on the IPP
products offered. Unlike traditional product placements, the fact that the
viewer may actively seek information about a product helps avoid viewer
deception.
Further, the current ban on traditional product placement in television
broadcasting may actually be counterproductive, since it is not enforced
strictly. Product placement occurs routinely on German TV screens as US
and other foreign productions often contain product placements. This is
tolerated, because legislators and courts consider a trade-off between the
freedom of program choice and the risk of surreptitious advertising to be
acceptable.39 One might also presume that German productions sometimes
breach the separation principle, since it is difficult to provide evidence and
enforcement costs are high. Moreover, German movies initially produced for
theatrical release are permitted to legally contain product placement. These
motion pictures, however, typically find their way to television, too. Taken as
a whole, this constitutes a confusing situation for television viewers. Viewers
that believe in good faith that the ban on product placement is consistently
enforced under the current regime seem more likely candidates for deception
than viewers reasonably apprised of product placement or IPP in a movie.
4.3.3 Potential Cost-Inefficiencies/Dynamic Inefficien-
cies
Media-dependent IPP regulations, and most notably the discrepancy between
internet-related services and television broadcasting, will become increasingly
meaningless with convergence. Future viewers could own a device that en-
ables them to surf the internet, watch television, play music, and possibly
call their friends. In a convergent world, then, the viewer’s susceptibility to
deception is quite independent of the transmission technology.
39See Engels and Giebel (2000), p. 278.
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Given that the actual technological realization of IPP is still an open
question, existing regulations could prevent a cost-efficient application of
IPP. Technologies that are relatively close to traditional television broad-
casting are likely to be banned while teleservices-oriented technologies such
as internet-based applications of IPP are permitted. Furthermore, hampering
a new technology always implies the risk of dynamic inefficiencies.
4.3.4 US Regulations and Competitive Disadvantage
In the US, the legal setting differs considerably from German legislation. In
the US motion pictures that are produced initially for theatrical exhibition
face no regulations at all. Nevertheless, product placement has been in pub-
lic debate for a while and some critics are seeking legislative regulations.
For instance, the Center for Science in the Public Interest has called on the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and State Attorney General to
require that product placement be disclosed to theatrical movie audiences.
Similarly, the Center for the Study of Commercialism has asked the Fed-
eral Trade Commission (FTC) to require disclosure of product placement.
However, neither inquiry lead to the creation of any regulations.40
Regarding television broadcasting, product placement is not banned, ei-
ther. However, § 317 of the Communications Act of 1934 demands product
placement to be announced, if the station receives a payment:41
“All matter broadcast by any radio station for which any money,
services or other valuable consideration is directly or indirectly paid, or
promised to or charged by the station so television broadcasting, from
any person, shall, at the time the same is so broadcast, be announced
as paid for or furnished, as the case may be, by such person.”
Hence, there exist no regulations that would ban IPP in the United States,
if it is announced.42 Against that background, a ban on IPP may also create
40For details, see Snyder (1992), p. 312 and FTC File no. P 914518.
41In addition, a similar prescription is given by a FCC regulation. See § 73.1212 FCC
= 47 CRF 73.1212.
42Nevertheless, product placement could conceivably be classified as commercial speech
in a future decision. The theoretical argument here is that movies with product placement
are denied protection of freedom of speech under the First Amendment of the Constitution
of the United States. Hence, further regulation could be possible. However, Snyder (1992)
who provides an in-depth analysis of this issue concludes that “...such movies should not
be regulated under the commercial speech doctrine” (p. 309).
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a substantial competitive disadvantage for Germany with respect to prod-
uct innovations in the audiovisual and telecommunications industry. Con-
sider, for instance, innovative program formats and potentially associated
technological innovations that may be created by deploying IPP. Dynamic
inefficiency is also therefore relevant in this context.
In summary, we suggest that, from a Basic Law perspective, (i) neither the
protection of the “market for opinions” nor consumer deception necessarily
provide sufficient legal bases to outlaw IPP in Germany. Therefore, IPP could
be realized, if advertising regulations were modified. Further, we conclude
that (ii) the current ban on product placement is counterproductive, (iii)
may cause cost-inefficiencies with respect to technological choices, and (iv)
may induce dynamic inefficiencies. Finally, a ban on IPP (v) may constitute
a substantial international competitive disadvantage.
Interestingly, one aspect of product placement is usually not considered
in the legal discussion. That is the observation that viewers might simply feel
disturbed by product placement, especially, if product placement might have
influence on the “ideal” plot of a movie. In the following, part of the paper
we turn to this and other economic issues that explicitly refer to potential
costs and benefits of IPP.
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4.4 Economic Analysis
In contrast to the juridical view on IPP, which stresses problems of viewer
deception and the role of television broadcasting for the “market for opin-
ions,” we do not consider these to be the main issues for IPP. Rather, we
seek to evaluate the possible ban on IPP against the costs it might cause and
the benefits it might deliver to viewers, advertisers, and broadcasters.
Advertising serves as a link between product markets and the television
market. We consider that it entails both positive and negative effects. On the
one hand, it disturbs viewers who would prefer to watch a program without
interruptions or product placement.43 On the other hand advertisements
finance the programing. Moreover, advertisers benefit from selling products
as a result of advertising and broadcasters benefit from “selling” their viewers
to advertisers.
Our intention is to perform welfare comparisons by contrasting two set-
tings: one with commercials (advertising spots) only and the other with com-
mercials and IPP.
4.4.1 Related Literature
Two strands of economic literature relate to our analysis. First, some empir-
ical work has been carried out on the effects of advertising bans. This work
typically focuses on whether a ban on a specific type of product, such as alco-
holic beverages or tobacco, leads to less total demand. Duffy (1996) conducts
a survey of such studies and concludes that bans are generally ineffective. For
instance, Schneider, Klein, and Murphy (1981) analyze a ban on cigarette
advertising and find that it caused an increase in total consumption. They
suggest that one reason for this result may be that a ban leads to lower pro-
duction costs (because advertising is costly) and, therefore, to lower prices.
Stewart (1993), in contrast, analyzes data on tobacco advertising bans in six
OECD countries and finds negative, but statistically insignificant, effects on
total consumption. Theoretical literature on the issue is rare. One notable
exception is Motta (1997) who shows that the effect of an advertising ban
43Market research questionaires show that television commercials are by far the most
disliked type of advertising. A study from 1999 indicated that 98.8% of the interviewees
agreed that there is too much television advertising. In a similar questionaire 42.8% of
respondents found television commercials annoying. This indicates that there are, in fact,
nuisance costs from advertising (for reference see Media Digest (2000) Kino/Film/Video.
MMM/Hamburg, Issue 1/2000, p. 44 and p. 16).
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depends on two crucial points: the extent to which the ban tightens aggre-
gate demand at given prices and the extent to which the ban results in lower
equilibrium prices due to less advertising induced product differentiation.
Advertising bans therefore may raise or reduce total consumption.
For our question, however, neither the named empirical nor theoretical
literature is particularly instructive, since we seek to analyze the effects of
a ban on a specific type of advertisement and not the effects of a ban on
advertisements for specific products. Moreover, the literature does not take
into account the fact that advertisements may impose nuisance costs on con-
sumers, which is vital for our analysis.
The second strand of related literature refers to the economic analysis of
television and radio program choice. Work in this field traditionally focuses
on the question of how competition between broadcasters affects program
diversity.44 It is frequently argued by critics that there would be too many
“mass appeal” programs and too few programs for viewers with specialized
preferences in television. This focus might be one reason for the neglect of
advertising, which is typically considered exogenous in such models. More-
over, benefits to advertisers are usually ignored. There is, however, a growing
literature that considers advertising related issues more closely. For instance,
Vaglio (1995), Wright (1994), and Gabszewicz, Laussel, and Sonnac (1999)
address the effects of advertising rate regulations on quality and program
differentiation.45 Vaglio (1995) applies a Hotelling-type approach and finds
that rate regulations may reduce the degree of program quality. Broadcast-
ers’ decisions on program quality depend on advertising rates: if they choose
higher advertising levels, a higher investment in program quality is neces-
sary to keep audiences watching the program. However, the paper does not
identify the equilibrium path of the associated sequential game, which re-
duces considerably the scope of the presented conclusion.46 Similarly Wright
(1994) explains that, although advertising quantity restrictions may reduce
nuisance costs, they may also reduce program quality. Therefore, its effect
on viewers’ welfare is ambiguous. Gabszewicz, Laussel, and Sonnac (1999)
44For comprehensive surveys, see Owen and Wildman (1992), Chapter 3 and 4, and
Brown and Cave (1992).
45In addition, Nilssen and Sorgard (2000) present a model of the television industry
that covers product markets, as well as markets for television programs. They find that
under a TV monopoly, there may be both, more advertisements, as well as more viewers,
compared to a TV duopoly. Another model is given by Owen and Wildman (1985), who
assume that higher advertising levels lead to smaller audiences. They compare viewer
surplus under pure advertising and pure price competition and find that viewer surplus is
identical for both settings.
46Gabszewicz, Laussel, and Sonnac (1999), p. 3., make this point.
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develop a three-stage sequential game with broadcasters, television viewers,
and advertising agencies. Broadcasters select their optimal program differ-
entiation and their optimal advertising rates, taking into account an upper
advertising limit imposed by the government. The authors find that pro-
gram diversity rises with the level of advertising, while at the same time
nuisance costs from advertising increase. Within this model, the net effect
of advertising regulation is positive, because the reduction of the nuisance
cost of advertising dominates the negative effect of advertising regulation on
program diversity. Another facet of advertising in the television market is
presented by Anderson and Coate (2000). Their model considers that adver-
tising may entail negative external effects on viewers, because broadcasters
care only about viewers who switch their channel off and not about viewers’
nuisance cost intensities. Therefore, inefficiencies concerning the number of
advertisements may occur. There are two potential sources of inefficiencies.
The market may provide too few or too many commercials. Specifically, the
result depends on the relative size of the social benefits, i.e., the benefits
from sales triggered by advertisements and program provision, on one hand,
and the nuisance costs which burden television viewers, on the other.
In the following we develop a model that is based on the approach of
Anderson and Coate (2000), but which extends their work in that it (i)
incorporates IPP as an additional source of broadcasters’ revenues, and (ii)
considers increasing marginal nuisance cost of both interruptive advertising
and IPP. The intention of our analysis is to assess economic welfare effects
of the potential ban on IPP in Germany.
4.4.2 The Model
Television broadcasting is a good consumed by advertisers and viewers. In
general, it is a private good for advertisers and a public good from the au-
dience’s point of view.47 We consider advertising to provide information on
the existence of new goods to consumers and, therefore, to facilitate benefi-
cial trades.48 We assume that there are two television broadcasters, A and
47For simplicity, we ignore viewer exclusion.
48The role of advertising can be analyzed from distinct perspectives. The literature on
the matter can roughly be divided into two extreme positions. One claims that advertis-
ing acts as a means of persuasion and alters consumer preferences. Therefore, advertising
creates product differentiation that is not real. Work in this tradition is provided, e.g.,
by Kaldor (1950), Galbraith (1967), Solow (1967), and Nichols (1985). The second view
considers advertising primarily as a means of solving informational issues. Starting with
Telser (1964), numerous aspects of this role have been explored in the literature. Adver-
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B, and two types of programs t ∈ {1, 2}, both equally costly to produce.
The production of a program only causes fixed cost C. Further, two forms
of advertising, traditional commercials and IPP can be sold to advertisers.
Potential television viewers can be divided into two equally sized groups of
N individuals each. Each viewer is characterized by a pair (t, λ), where t
denotes the type of program the viewer prefers and λ denotes the fraction of
the viewing benefits from the less preferred program. The variable λ is dis-
tributed uniformly on the interval [−ε, 1] with ε ≥ 0. A viewer’s benefit from
watching the preferred program is β, with β ≥ 0, and λβ from watching the
less preferred program. This benefit can, due to nuisance costs, be reduced
by both types of advertising. We suppose that the marginal nuisance cost
of interruptive advertising increases with the number of commercials a and,
likewise, the marginal nuisance cost of IPP rises with the number of IPP z in
the program.49 This follows the concept of rising marginal disutility, which is
a standard concept in a number of economic fields associated with negative
or unpleasant issues. For instance, the cost of work in terms of effort in labor
economics and pollution costs in environmental economics. Further, the cost
of advertising depends on a parameter γ ≥ 0 which represents the level of
nuisance cost of advertisements to viewers. This parameter is assumed to be
identical for all viewers and across the two forms of advertising. More specif-
ically, we suppose that a viewer’s net benefit from watching the preferred
program is
up(β, a, z) = β − 1
2
γ(a2 + z2)
and
ulp(λ, β, a, z) = λβ − 1
2
γ(a2 + z2)
from watching the less preferred program.50 A viewer who does not watch
tising has been interpreted as a signal for product quality (Milgrom and Roberts (1986)).
We follow Butters (1977), Grossman and Shapiro (1984) and Stegeman (1991) in concen-
trating on advertising for new goods, i.e., we assume consumers only buy once they have
seen the product advertised.
49The number z may also be considered to be the degree of negative influence of IPP
on the “ideal” plot of a movie.
50This formulation greatly simplifies the analysis by implying that consumers receive no
benefits from watching advertisements. However, product placements could conceivably
benefit viewers. For instance, the way BMWs are presented in James Bond movies might
be appreciated by many viewers. The same holds for commercials. In Germany, the
Cannes Rolle provides a fun compilation of commercials that is even shown in movie
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any program receives zero benefit. If λ is negative viewers suffer from watch-
ing the less preferred program and the larger ε, the more viewers fall in
this category.51 Finally, we assume that viewers who are indifferent about
whether they watch a type-1 or a type-2 program will watch either program
with identical probability.
With regard to producers that wish to advertise, we assume that there are
m producers of new goods that can produce at most one product at a constant
cost per unit, which is set to zero without loss of generality. Each good is
of a type σ which is distributed uniformly on the interval [0, σ̄], with σ̄ < 1.
A higher type σ indicates that a product is more attractive to consumers.
Each viewer watching a commercial or IPP will receive information on the
existence of the advertised good. If a viewer watches an advertisement she or
he will either have a willingness to pay ω > 0 for the product with probability
σ or a willingness to pay 0 with probability 1− σ. The assumption that all
viewers have a willingness to pay ω or 0 implies that each producer will
set a price ω, because a lower price would not increase the probability of
a sale. Therefore, a producer of a good of type σ is willing to pay σω for
contacting each viewer. Furthermore, this implies that producers extract
all the surplus from the trades that are stimulated by advertisements, i.e.,
viewers do not benefit from buying the advertised good. Moreover, we assume
that the information on the existence of a new good is the essential feature of
advertisements and, therefore, repetition of advertisements to the audience
does not increase the probability of a sale. Within this setting, producers
are indifferent with respect to the kind of advertisement they choose.
The Ban: Commercials Only
If broadcasters sell advertising spots only, the demand for advertisements can
be described as follows. Let p denote the price per viewer of a commercial.
Then the number of firms that wish to advertise is a(p) = m · [1− p
ωσ̄
] and the
corresponding inverse demand curve is p(a) = ωσ̄ · [1 − a
m
] (see also Figure
4.2 on page 85).52 Note that each producer’s demand for advertising on one
channel is independent of its demand for advertising on the other channel,
due to the assumed constant marginal cost of production and the assumption
theatres.
51For some viewers, folk music could be costly to watch, while others might suffer from
watching MTV.
52These functions are approximated to avoid analytical difficulties of step functions.
The fit of the approximation depends positively on the number of producers of new goods
m.
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that viewers watch only one program.
The two broadcasters A and B are supposed to maximize their profits
via the choice of the type of programming they offer and the choice of the
price per viewer of commercials. We consider the situation as a three-stage
Cournot-type game. In stage one, each broadcaster chooses its type of pro-
gram and whether to operate. In stage two, given the choices of stage one,
each broadcaster chooses its profit-maximizing level of commercials. In stage
three, given the choices of the previous stages, viewers decide if and which
program to watch. The subgame perfect Nash equilibria of this game can
then be solved by backward induction.
Consider stage 3 first. Viewer decisions on watching a program depend
on the advertising levels of the broadcasters. If broadcaster A has the lower
advertising level, it will get all N type-1 viewers and those viewers of type 2
for whom (1− λ)β < 1
2
γ(a2B − a2A) or, verbally, for whom the cost of viewing
the less preferred broadcaster is lower than the cost of more advertising
on the preferred broadcaster.53 Similarly, if A has the higher advertising
level, its program is watched by all type-1 viewers, except those for whom
(1− λ)β < 1
2
γ(a2B − a2A).54
Now, suppose that in stage two, broadcaster A chooses the type-1 pro-
gram and B chooses type 2. In this case, each broadcaster may set a price
per viewer p(aJ), J ∈ {A, B}, which is independent of the advertising level of
the other broadcaster, because each broadcaster has a monopoly in selling its
viewers to advertisers. On the other hand, the overall number of viewers each
broadcaster gets depends on the advertising level of the other broadcaster.
Accordingly, A’s and B’s profit functions are:
πA = N [1 +
γ(a2B − a2A)
2β(1 + ε)
]R(aA)− C,
with R(aA) = p(aA)aA and
πB = N [1 +
γ(a2A − a2B)
2β(1 + ε)
]R(aB)− C,
with R(aB) = p(aB)aB.
53For simplicity, we assume that each broadcaster chooses an advertising level that does
not drive all viewers away, i.e., a <
√
2β
γ . We take this into account in the welfare analysis
that follows, and naturally, exclude negative values for a.
54See the appendix to this chapter for a detailed description of viewer choice and asso-
ciated broadcaster profit functions.
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Differentiating w.r.t. aA and aB yields
∂πA/∂aA = N
[
1 +
γ(a2B − a2A)
2β(1 + ε)
]
R′(aA)−N
γaA
β(1 + ε)
R(aA) (4.1)
and
∂πB/∂aB = N
[
1 +
γ(a2A − a2B)
2β(1 + ε)
]
R′(aB)−N
γaB
β(1 + ε)
R(aB). (4.2)
Expressions (4.1) and (4.2) reveal two effects. The first term of the
marginal profit functions on the right-hand side represents the marginal rev-
enues from all viewers who watch the program of the broadcaster, while the
second term indicates the loss of revenues from viewers who switch to the
other channel. Obviously, broadcasters face a trade-off between a higher
price per advertisement against the loss of viewers that switch to the other
broadcaster.
In equilibrium, the first derivatives of A’s and B’s profit function must
equal zero. It is straightforward to show that the equilibrium levels of adver-
tising a∗A, a
∗
B are equal such that a
∗
A = a
∗
B = a
∗.55 Figure 4.1 illustrates the
way to that equilibrium. It depicts broadcasters’ reaction functions rA(aB)
and rB(aA), which represent the profit-maximizing output for each output
choice of the other broadcaster. The Cournot equilibrium is at (a∗A, a
∗
B),
where the two reaction functions cross.
Tedious, but simple, evaluations show that the reaction functions have
positive slopes. Moreover, the slopes are smaller than one, which indicates
that a unique symmetric equilibrium exists.
By substitution of a∗ for a∗A and a
∗
B, the optimal decision of each broad-
caster can be expressed as
R′(a∗) =
γa∗R(a∗)
β(1 + ε)
. (4.3)
In other words broadcasters maximize their profits when marginal rev-
enues equal marginal costs, which are represented by the term on the right-
hand side of equation (4.3) and equal marginal lost revenues per viewer. In
55Consider a∗A > a
∗
B . Both the first term and the second term of the right-hand side
of (4.1) are negative. Hence, if a∗A > a
∗
B , there is no equilibrium. The same applies to
a∗B > a
∗
A with respect to (4.2).
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Figure 4.1: Reaction Functions and Cournot Equilibrium
terms of equation (4.3), the equilibrium is characterized by Figure 4.2 on
page 85.
As can easily be seen from equation (4.3) and Figure 4.2, the level of a∗
depends negatively on the nuisance cost parameter and positively on viewers’
benefits from watching television.
By recourse on the inverse demand function, equation (4.3) can be rewrit-
ten as
1− 2a
∗
m
=
γa∗
β(1 + ε)
(1− a
∗
m
)a∗ (4.4)
which we use for the determination of a∗ in the welfare analysis.
In stage one, both broadcasters will choose to provide different programs.
If they chose the same type of program, competition for viewers would be
4.4. Economic Analysis 85
Figure 4.2: Optimal Number of Commercials
introduced and result in zero profits, because the broadcaster with less adver-
tising gains all viewers. Hence, rational broadcasters would not give up their
monopoly in selling their viewers to advertisers and would choose different
programs.56
No Ban: Commercials and IPP
Now consider a case where broadcasters sell both interruptive advertising
and IPP. At stage 3, viewers’ decisions are similar to the case above. If
broadcaster A has the lower advertising level, it will get all N type-1 viewers
and those viewers of type 2 for whom (1−λ)β < 1
2
γ[(a2B +z
2
B)− (a2A +z2A)].57
56For the sake of completeness, the question as to whether the channels would operate
at all depends on the extent of the fixed cost C. There would be no operation where C
exceeds the revenues that one broadcaster generates. One broadcaster would operate if C
is less than these revenues, but exceeds each broadcaster’s revenues in the case that two
firms operate, and both would operate if C is less than the latter revenues. Given the
high number of broadcasters in the business, this question does not seem to be relevant
to reality.
57See the appendix to this chapter. We assume that broadcasters choose an advertising
level that does not drive away all viewers, i.e., a <
√
2β
γ − z2 and z <
√
2β
γ − a2. We
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Similarly, if A has the higher advertising level, then its program is watched by
all type-1 viewers except those for whom (1−λ)β < 1
2
γ[(a2B +z
2
B)−(a2A+z2A)].
Turning to stage 2, note that broadcasters will sell the same amount of
a and z. This is an optimal strategy because, due to increasing marginal
nuisance costs, the number of viewers who stop watching the channel for a
given revenue is minimized if a = z. Therefore, the maximum “demand”
for each type of advertising becomes m/2 from each broadcaster’s point of
view such that half of the potential advertisers will be offered interruptive
advertising and the other half will be offered IPP. More specifically, let p◦
denote the per-viewer price of a commercial and q denote the per-viewer price
of an IPP. The number of firms that buy the two types of advertisements are
a(p◦) = 1
2
m·[1− p◦
ωσ̄
] and z(q) = 1
2
m·[1− q
ωσ̄
], respectively. The corresponding
inverse demand curves are given by p◦(a) = ωσ̄·[1− 2a
m
] and q(z) = ωσ̄·[1− 2z
m
].
It follows that the profit functions of A and B are
π◦A = N
[
1 +
γ[(a2B + z
2
B)− (a2A + z2A)]
2β(1 + ε)
]
[R◦(aA) + R(zA)]− C,
with R◦(aA) = p
◦(aA)aA, R(zA) = q(zA)zA and
π◦B = N
[
1 +
γ[(a2A + z
2
A)− (a2B + z2B)]
2β(1 + ε)
]
[R◦(aB) + R(zB)]− C,
with R◦(aB) = p
◦(aB)aB, R(zB) = q(zB)zB.
Solving for the broadcaster equilibrium levels of advertising (a◦∗A , a
◦∗
B , z
∗
A, z
∗
B),
it is straightforward to show a◦∗A = a
◦∗
B = z
∗
A = z
∗
B = θ
∗. Hence, in equilib-
rium, it is given that
R′(θ∗) =
γθ∗
β(1 + ε)
[R(θ∗) + R(θ∗)].
Figure 4.3 illustrates the optimal number of advertisements in equilib-
rium.58
have to take this into account in the welfare analysis that follows. Naturally, we exclude
negative values for both types of advertising.
58Note that Figure 4.3 is a simplification. It is limited to two, instead of three, dimen-
sions.
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Figure 4.3: Optimal Numbers of Commercials and IPP
By substitution, we obtain
1− 4θ
∗
m
=
γθ∗
β(1 + ε)
2[θ∗ − 2θ
∗2
m
] (4.5)
which we use for the determination of θ∗ in the welfare analysis.
As before, in stage one both broadcasters will choose to provide different
programs. If they chose the same type of program, competition would result
in zero profits.59
4.4.3 Welfare Analysis
What are the total benefits generated by the provision of advertising financed
television with respect to the two cases considered above? Viewer benefits
consist of the benefits from watching their favorite program less the nuisance
59With respect to channel provision there would be no operation where C exceeds the
revenues that one broadcaster generates. One broadcaster would operate if C is less than
these revenues, but exceeds each broadcaster’s revenues in the case that two firms operate,
and both would operate if C is less than the latter revenues.
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cost of advertising. Advertisers gain from selling their products to viewers
and suffer from the price they pay for their advertisements. Broadcasters
receive revenue from selling advertising space to advertisers less the fixed cost
C of providing the program. These considerations give the following functions
of the overall benefits B associated with advertising-financed television.60
Assuming broadcasters operate and IPP is banned, total benefits B are
B(a∗) = 2N(β − 1
2
γa∗2) + 2N
∫ a∗
0
ωσ(1− α
m
)dα. (4.6)
The first of the two terms represents viewers’ welfare in equilibrium, while
the second term accounts for the welfare of producers and broadcasters.61
With IPP benefits add up to62
B(θ∗) = 2N(β − γθ∗2) + 4N
∫ θ∗
0
ωσ(1− 2α
m
)dφ. (4.7)
The crucial question is in which case aggregated welfare is larger, i.e.,
if B(a∗) S B(θ∗). However, the general solution of this is relationship is
complex and not informative. We therefore solve the model parametrically.
In doing so, we first solve for the optimal a∗ and θ∗ using (4.4) and (4.5),
respectively. Next, we calculate the associated welfare by substituting a∗
and θ∗ in (4.6) and (4.7). Table 4.1 presents welfare results for different
assumptions on the level of the nuisance cost γ.
The parameter values we have assumed are: β = 6, ε = 2, m = 15, ω =
0.03, σ = 0.9, N = 100. We have chosen these specific values in order to get
a close approximation of reality. For instance, β is 6 because rental charges
in video stores are about DEM 6 (¿ 3). Similarly, m is 15, because 15
commercials per movie seems a reasonable number, the product ωσ is 0.027,
because the price to contact 1000 viewers in German television is about
DEM 27 (¿ 14) for a 10 second spot.63 Only N has been chosen arbitrarily
60fixed costs are neglected as C is the same in both cases. We are only interested here
in the differences in welfare.
61More explicitly, producers’ welfare plus channels’ welfare (neglecting C) is
2N
∫ a∗
0
ωσ(1 − αm )dα − p(a
∗)a∗ + p(a∗)a∗, which is simply the integral under the inverse
demand function up to a∗.
62This is a simplification of B(a◦∗, z∗) = 2N(β − 12γ(a
◦∗2 + z∗2)) + 2N
∫ a◦∗
0
ωσ(1 −
2α
m )dα + 2N
∫ z∗
0
ωσ(1− 2cm )dc, which accounts for viewers’ welfare from watching the two
programs and for producers’ welfare.
63Source: IP Deutschland GmbH, 2000, TV-Werbung für Einsteiger, p. 24.
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Nuisance cost level γ
0 0.01 0.025 0.05
Ban on IPP:
Total welfare B(a∗) 1230.40 1175.50 1099.30 986.66
Advertising level a∗ 7.5 7.39 7.22 6.96
Viewers’ welfare 1200.00 1145.40 1069.70 957.79
Producers’ & broadcasters’ welfare 30.40 30.10 29.60 28.87
No ban on IPP:
Total welfare B(θ∗) 1230.40 1202.70 1163.80 1104.50
Advertising level θ∗ 3.75 3.70 3.63 3.53
Advertising level 2θ∗ 7.5 7.40 7.26 7.06
Viewers’ welfare 1200.00 1172.60 1134.10 1075.40
Producers’ & broadcasters’ welfare 30.40 30.10 29.70 29.10
Table 4.1: Parametric Welfare Comparisons Ban vs. No Ban on IPP for
Different Nuisance Cost Levels
(which has no qualitative effects) such that numbers are kept small.64
The results indicate that a ban on IPP leads to a lower welfare level
if viewers feel disturbed by advertisements, i.e., if γ > 0. Moreover, both
viewer and producer/broadcaster welfare is higher where IPP is permitted
and overall advertising levels are higher with IPP. Interestingly, audiences
are better off, although we have assumed that viewers do not benefit from
buying the products that are advertised and advertising levels are higher
with IPP. The reason for this observation is that viewers prefer a situation
where advertising spots can be substituted with IPP.
For γ = 0 we find no differences in welfare. If viewers do not care about
advertisements, broadcasters offer monopoly advertising quantities to pro-
ducers. These quantities are m/2 if there is only interruptive advertising and
m/4 in the case where IPP can also be sold to advertisers (see Figures 4.2
and 4.3).
To sum up, our analysis shows that toleration of IPP has the potential
to enhance economic welfare.
64Many calculations with alternative parameter values gave us the same qualitative
results.
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4.5 Conclusion
Our analysis suggests that valid arguments can be made against the appli-
cation of the principle of separation to IPP. The essential objectives of the
principle of separation – the protection of the “market for opinions” and the
avoidance of “viewer deception” – are not at risk if IPP is introduced, pro-
vided the utilization of IPP is announced. This statement is supported by
several arguments.
With respect to the protection of the “market for opinions,” a bias to-
wards broadcasting motion pictures with IPP in the sense of Aklerof’s (1970)
“market for lemons” may easily be prevented by compelling broadcasters to
announce IPP. Moreover, broadcast motion pictures are only part of the
“market for opinions.” Further, competition for fastidious audiences, can be
expected to provide a variety of movies and opinions especially, because com-
petition is supported by numerous television broadcasting provisions that
supplement general competition law. Finally, public broadcasters, which
reach the largest share of viewers in Germany, are committed to present a
diversity of opinions.
Moreover, given the number of legal and illegal possibilities of achieving
product placement on the TV-screen, we suspect that the separation principle
actually confuses viewers and is, therefore, counterproductive.
Our critical review of the legal framework of IPP has shown that a ban
may generate cost-inefficiencies in technological choices and create dynamic
inefficiencies. In addition, a ban may establish an international competitive
disadvantage. Our theoretical model on the effects of a ban provides welfare
economic arguments that indicate IPP has the potential to enhance economic
welfare.
Summarizing, we would suggest that lawmakers should carefully consider
the application of the separation principle in the case of IPP. An obligation
to announce whether a program contains IPP seems sufficient to prevent
deception of viewers and helps advertisers to gain the benefits of IPP. At
the very least, flexible regulations such as the permission of IPP for private
broadcasters or specific channels should be considered.
With respect to the economic model we have proposed, it would be in-
teresting to explore a number of extensions in future work. Above all, an
analysis of the effects of banning IPP on program diversity would be reward-
ing. Further, the impact of informational benefits to viewers, asymmetric
nuisance costs and benefits, asymmetric group size, and asymmetric values
of different groups to advertisers could be addressed.
Chapter 5
Conclusion
The above analysis considered the economic impact of three pieces of legisla-
tion on the German motion picture industry, and more specifically, how they
influence economic efficiency. In addition, major market and institutional
characteristics of the German motion picture industry were analyzed. The
study found that the legislation considered generally had an adverse effect
on economic efficiency. Moreover, the regulatory outcomes in some cases
appeared to contradict the stated purposes of the legislation.
Chapter 2 indicated several drawbacks in the allocation of subsidies
through the reference film principle as specified in the German Film Act. The
analysis suggested that the principle de facto violates a central condition for
legitimate subsidies, i.e., the reference film principle tends to subsidize firms
that do not need subsidies to produce their products. Moreover, the refer-
ence film principle was found to be improperly defined in the economic sense;
it rewards absolute admission numbers rather than profitability and sets in-
centives to choose inefficiently high budgets. Moreover, it was found that
the committee principle weakens the relationship between expenditures and
earnings and distorts producers’ incentives to make films suited to audience
preferences. In recognizing that subsidization of the German film industry is
a political reality, it was suggested that an adjusted reference film principle
may be preferable. The proposed approach would require that the reference
film principle rewards economic success rather than absolute admission num-
bers. It also calls for reducing the “extra” profits of producers, for instance,
by prescribing some type of sharing contract between the state and the pro-
ducer. In this context, incentives to produce for the market could still be
set, while “extra” profits were limited. With respect to our analysis of the
determinants of success of German movies at the box office and in terms of
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rate of return, it was suggested that the skills of production companies and
directors are among the most decisive factors. This result may be linked with
the distribution of profits across producers in the industry. While German
producers can generally be expected to produce films that lose money, the
analysis found it was possible to identify an economically successful type of
producers that consistently generates positive profits.
Chapter 3 considered the economic effects of recent amendments to Ger-
many’s Copyright Law. The analysis indicated that the legislative assump-
tion of the structural superiority of media companies has no sound economic
foundation with regard to the German motion picture industry. It is implau-
sible that significant buyer power prevails in these markets. Thus, corrections
to compensate for a fictive “structural superiority” create economic ineffi-
ciencies. First, it was found that fostering the creation and use of collective
remuneration schemes implies labor market frictions. Under such conditions,
producers typically experience lower profits, and thus find it reasonable to
avoid such losses by relocating production to other jurisdictions or by exit-
ing the business. It is thus unclear whether the law actually increases the
total remuneration of creative talents. Second, the de facto prescription of
sharing contracts under a “blockbuster” clause distorts efficient risk alloca-
tion, shifts risk onto creative talent, increases transaction costs, and reduces
producers’ incentives to promote their movies on national and international
markets. Clearly, this contradicts the legislative intent of protecting creative
talent from bearing risk. Finally, the law was found to affect the economic
outcomes negatively by generating legal uncertainty.
Chapter 4 contemplated the economic impact of advertising regulations
with respect to “interactive product placement” (IPP). The analysis iden-
tified regulations and rulings that might be applied to IPP and suggested
that, although IPP likely violates the principle of separation between pro-
graming and advertising, it might not necessarily violate the underlying pol-
icy reasons for the separation principle from a constitutional point of view.
First, deception of viewers cannot reasonably be considered to be a problem
where viewers are made aware of IPP. Second, we suggest that movies only
play a modest role in building public opinion. Moreover, given the num-
ber of allowed and forbidden possibilities of making product placements on
the TV screen, we suspect that the separation principle might only confuse
viewers. Finally, we noted several drawbacks from a ban on IPP, including
cost-inefficiencies with respect to technological choices, dynamic inefficiencies
with respect to the production of audiovisual hardware and software, and in-
creased international competitive disadvantage. Our analysis of potential
costs and benefits of IPP also showed that welfare economic considerations
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may support the application of IPP.
In a way, our analysis suggests that the famous saying: “If it ain’t broke,
don’t fix it” (Bert Lance) should be applied to the politics of the German
motion picture industry: subsidies are payed to firms that do not need them;
buyer power is fighted where there is none; and advertising regulations are
based on questionable grounds.
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feld zwischen nationaler staatlicher Förderung und US-amerikanischer
Mediendominanz. Lang, Frankfurt a.M.
Judge, G. G., Griffiths, W. E., Carter Hill, R., Lütkepohl, H., and Lee, T.-C.
(1985). The theory and practice of econometrics. John Wiley, New York,
2nd edition.
Kaldor, N. (1950). The economic aspects of advertising. Review of Economic
Studies, 18:1–27.
Karp, L. S. and Perloff, J. M. (1993). Legal requirements that artists receive
resale royalties. International Review of Law and Economics, 13:163–
177.
Kleinbaum, D. G., Kupper, L. L., and Muller, K. E. (1988). Applied re-
gression analysis and other multivariate methods. PWS Kent, Boston,
Mass., 2nd edition.
Kommission Zur Ermittlung der Konzentration Im Medienbereich - KEK
(2000). Bericht der KEK über die Entwicklung der Konzentration und
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Table A.2.2: Definition of the Variables S-PROD and VS-PROD
Production company Admissions per movie (average) Category
Ascot Film 392,781 S-PROD
Avista 168,426 S-PROD
Boje-Buck 229,300 S-PROD
Constantin 723,106 VS-PROD
Delta 163,988 S-PROD
Diana Film 3,250,411 VS-PROD
Dream Joint Venture 137,052 S-PROD
Ecco Film 392,781 S-PROD
ENA 710,081 VS-PROD
Futura Film 144,305 S-PROD
Hager-Moss Film 1,236,373 VS-PROD
John Filmproduktion 571,930 VS-PROD
Lichtblick 123,213 S-PROD
Mr. Brown 710,081 VS-PROD
Olga-Film 137,522 S-PROD
Pandora Film 351,276 S-PROD
Prokino 137,522 S-PROD
Real Film 101,369 S-PROD
Rialto 346,204 S-PROD
Road Movies 120,427 S-PROD
Royal-Film 831,939 VS-PROD
SAM 1,315,357 VS-PROD
Senator 1,693,591 VS-PROD
Tele-München 158,104 S-PROD
Trickcompany 3,066,325 VS-PROD
UFA 206,892 S-PROD
Warner 137,052 S-PROD
Source: Business Reports of the FFA 1993-1998, own calculations.
This list enumerates all production companies that have produced German
films (i) with more than 100,000 viewers (ii) premiering between 1993 and 1998,
and (iii) not included in the sample used for the regressions. Classification in the
category VS-PROD occurred only with firms that had average viewer numbers per
film of over 500,000. It is interesting to note that German production companies
usually produce only a few films per year; e.g., in only two instances between 1993
to 1998 did a production company produce more than three films in one year.
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Table A.2.3: Well Known Actors
Adorf, Mario
Arent, Eddi
Béart, Emanuelle
Becker, Ben Schlafes Bruder (1995)
Berben, Iris
Binoche, Juliette Die Liebenden von Pont-Neuf (1991)
Bleibtreu, Moritz Das Stadtgespräch (1995)
Brandauer, Klaus-Maria
Close, Glenn
Ferres, Veronica Schtonk! (1992)
George, Götz
Gerhart, Tom
Guinness, Alec
Heinze, Thomas Allein unter Frauen (1991)
Jacob, Irene Die zwei Leben der Veronika (1991)
Juhnke, Harald
Kirchberger, Sonja
Krebs, Dieter
Król, Joachim Wir können auch anders (1993)
Lauterbach, Heiner
Makatsch, Heike Männerpension (1996)
Marceau, Sophie
Mueller-Stahl, Armin
Muti, Ornella
Ochsenknecht, Uwe
Paul, Christiane Knocking on Heavens’ Door (1997)
Piccoli, Michel
Potente, Franka Nach fünf im Urwald (1995)
Richter, Ilja
Richter, Jason James Free Willy (1993)
Riemann, Katja Abgeschminkt (1993)
Rois, Sophie Wir können auch anders (1993)
Rossellini, Isabelle
Sägebrecht, Marianne
Sander, Otto
Schneider, Helge
Schrader, Maria Keiner liebt mich (1994)
Schweiger, Til Der bewegte Mann (1994)
Schygulla, Hanna
Semmelrogge, Martin
Sommer, Elke
Streep, Meryl
Thalbach, Katharina
Trintignant, Jean Louis
Vogel, Jürgen Kleine Haie (1992)
Wiesinger, Kai Kleine Haie (1992)
Apart from long time well known actors, actors who have recently played a leading
role (as shown by the Internet Movie Database or the Internationales Lexikon des Films,
respectively) in a popular movie have also been taken into account. Accordingly, these
“new” well known actors have only been integrated into the analysis after enjoying their
first big success (more than 400,000 admissions). In these cases we have cited the relevant
films and the years in which they premiered. Finally, celebrities whose popularity has
resulted in film appearances have also been listed. These are Helge Schneider, Tom Gerhart
and the cabaret artists of “Badesalz”.
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Table A.2.4: Successful Directors
August, Billie
Buck, Detlev Karniggels (1991)
Dörrie, Doris
Garnier, Katja von Abgeschminkt (1993)
Hahn, Gerhard Werner - Beinhart (1990)
Kaufmann, Rainer Stadtgespräch (1995)
Peter, Timm Go Trabi Go (1991)
Schaack, Michael Werner - Beinhart (1990)
Schlöndorff, Volker
Trotta, Margarethe von
Tykwer, Tom Winterschläfer (1997)
Verhoeven, Michael
Vilsmaier, Joseph
Wenders, Wim
Wortmann, Sönke Allein unter Frauen (1991)
Successful directors are, like their acting counterparts, established directors
or directors who have recently directed a popular film (more than 400,000 ad-
missions). These “new” well known directors have only been integrated into the
analysis after enjoying their first big success. In these cases we have cited the
relevant movies and the years in which they premiered.
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Table A.2.5: Distributors’ Size, 1993-1998
Distributor 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Categorya
Buena Vista 16 23 21.8 17.9 20.1 21.2 MAJOR
CI 0 5 6.2 0 0 0 MINIMAJOR
Columbia 16 9 8.5 7.6 12.4 7.2 MAJOR
Concorde 2 3 4.4 5.2 2 2 MINIMAJOR
Constantin 3 0 4.4 9.9 9 4.3 MINIMAJOR
Delphi 0 0 0 2.7 0 0 INDEPENDENT
Fox 7 8 3.3 12.7 11 21.7 MAJOR
Jugendfilm 0 0 0 1 0 0 INDEPENDENT
Kinowelt 0 0 0 1.4 5.1 5.8 MINIMAJOR b
Pandora 2 0 1.2 2 0 0 INDEPENDENT
Polygram 0 0 0 0 7.5 2.7 MINIMAJOR
Prokino 0 0 0 1.1 0 2 INDEPENDENT
Scotia 2 0 4.3 0 0 2.3 INDEPENDENT
Senator 3 3 3.2 0 4.5 2.1 MINIMAJOR
Tobis 3 3 1.3 0 3 2 MINIMAJOR
UIP 20 27 21.6 23.7 14.9 16.8 MAJOR
Warner 21 15 14.6 8.6 7.2 7.6 MAJOR
Other 5 4 5.2 6.2 3.3 2.3 INDEPENDENT
Sum 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Blickpunkt:Film. Filmecho/Filmwoche.
aApproximated values are given for the years 1993 and 1994. Classification is
based on average market share (admissions) between 1993 and 1998: Major
starting at 10%, Minimajor starting at 1.5%, and Independent less than 1.5%.
bKinowelt was the only company to record steady growth between 1993 and
1998. Accordingly, it has been categorized as Independent for the years
1993 until 1996 and as Major for 1997 and 1998.
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Table A.2.7: Correlation Between P&A and the Number of Prints at Release
Title P&A (Euro) Prints P&A per print (Euro)
Feuerreiter 306,264 30 10,209
Requiem für eine romantische Frau 384,696 30 12,823
Fette Welt 255,646 34 7,519
Zugvögel 386,537 48 8,053
Trio, Das 1,210,739 55 22,014
Kurz & Schmerzlos 441,245 60 7,354
Musterknaben, Die 588,944 70 8,413
Südsee, eigene Insel 1,014,090 76 13,343
Palmetto 772,419 88 8,777
Frauen lügen nicht 613,550 98 6,261
Bis zum Horizont 434,598 156 2,786
Lola rennt 1,073,713 209 5,138
Frau Rettich... 810,909 216 3,754
Solo für Klarinette 1,027,958 229 4,489
Campus, Der 1,829,390 286 6,396
Cascadeur 1,114,105 299 3,726
Merkwürdige Verhalten..., Das 1,738,392 360 4,829
Average: 7,993
Correlation (P&A and prints): 0.79
Source: German Federal Film Board (FFA), Blickpunkt:Film, own calculations.
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Table A.2.8 : Movies in the Sample
...und der Himmel steht still Lola rennt
00 Schneider - Jagd auf Nihil Baxter Looosers
14 Tage Lebenslänglich Lorenz im Land der Lügner
2 Männer - 2 Frauen - 4 Probleme? Mambospiel, Das
Abbuzze! - Der Badesalz-Film Mann für jede Tonart, Ein
Adamski Männerpension, Die
Alles auf Anfang Maria
Alles nur Tarnung Maries Lied
Apothekerin, Die Mario und der Zauberer
Asterix in Amerika Mediocren, Die
Auf Wiedersehen, Amerika Moebius
Auge um Auge Mr, Bluesman
Ballermann 6 Mutters Courage
Bandits Nach fünf im Urwald
Beim nächsten Kuß knall ich ihn nieder Nostradamus
Benjamin Blümchen - Seine schönsten Abenteuer Nur aus Liebe
Bewegte Mann, Der Nur über meine Leiche
Broken Hearts Obsession
Bunte Hunde Palmetto
Cascadeur Peanuts - Die Bank zahlt alles
Charlie & Luise - Das doppelte Lottchen Pippi Langstrumpf
Childmurders - Kindermorde Prinz Eisenherz
Comedian Harmonists Prinzenbad
Couch in New York, Eine Probefahrt ins Paradies
Diebinnen Putzfraueninsel, Die
Dreifache Locke, Die Ratte, Die
Echte Kerle Rennschwein Rudi Rüssel
Einfach nur Liebe Rotwang muß weg!
Erste Semester, Das Roula
Ex Schelme von Schelm, Die
Felidae Schlafes Bruder
Frankie, Jonny und die Anderen Sieger, Die
Französische Frau, Eine Solo für Klarinette
Frau Rettich, die Czerny und ich Spur der roten Fässer, Die
Frauen sind was Wunderbares Stalingrad
Fräulein Smillas Gespür für Schnee Stille Nacht
Friedrich und der verzauberte Einbrecher Story von Monty Spinneratz
Für immer und immer Strand von Trouville, Der
Furchtlosen Vier, Die Stumme Zeugin
Geisterhaus, Das Tödliche Maria
Gespräch mit dem Biest Tödliches Verhältnis, Ein
Handbuch des jungen Giftmischers, Das Totmacher, Der
Harald Transatlantis
High Crusade - Frikassee im Weltraum Tykho Moon
Hollow Reed - Lautlose Schreie Und keiner weint mir nach
Honigmond Underground
Hunger - Sehnsucht nach Liebe Unendliche Geschichte III, Die
Inge, April und Mai Unhold, Der
Japaner sind die besseren Liebhaber Unter der Milchstrasse
Jenseits der Stille Utz
Jenseits der Wolken Versprechen, Das
Karakum Werner - Das muß kesseln!!!
Kaspar Hauser Widows - Erst die Ehe dann das Vergnügen
Knockin’ on Heavens’ Door Willy Bogners White Magic
Keiner liebt mich Winterschläfer
Lea Wir können auch anders
Leben ist eine Baustelle, Das Workaholic
Legende von Pinocchio Younger & Younger
Let’s talk about Sex Zirri - das Wolkenschaf
Liebe und andere Geschäfte Zugvögel...einmal nach Inari
Appendix to Chapter 4
Determination of Broadcasters’ Profit Functions
I. Commercials Only:
For the sake of simplicity, assume that Broadcaster A has chosen the type-1
program and B has chosen the type-2 program. Then the viewer’s choice will
depend on the number of advertisements on each channel:
 Assume broadcaster A has fewer advertisements:
If A has the lower advertising level, all type-1 viewers will choose A. Further,
those viewers of type 2 for whom
(1− λ)β < 1
2
γ(a2B − a2A)
⇔ 1− λ <
γ(a2B − a2A)
2β
will choose A, too. The fraction of the N type-2 viewers that choose broad-
caster A can be calculated by dividing the right hand side of the above expression
through the length of the interval of λ, which is 1 + ε. Therefore, that fraction is:
γ(a2B − a2A)
2β(1 + ε)
 Assume broadcaster A has more advertisements:
APPENDIX 112
If A has the higher advertising level, then its program is chosen by all type-1
viewers except those for whom (note that the right hand side is negative in this
case)
(1− λ)β < 1
2
γ(a2B − a2A)
⇔ 1− λ <
γ(a2B − a2A)
2β
The fraction of the N type-1 viewers that broadcaster A loses can be calculated
by dividing the right hand side of the above expression through the length of the
interval of λ, which is 1 + ε. Therefore, that fraction is again:
γ(a2B − a2A)
2β(1 + ε)
 Assume broadcasters have the same advertising levels:
All type-1 viewers for whom
β >
1
2
γ(a2A)
will watch A and all type-2 viewers for whom
β >
1
2
γ(a2B)
will watch B. All viewers who do not watch their preferred program switch off
because of the excessive advertising.
We can use the information from above to determine the broadcasters’ profit
functions, i.e.,
πA = N [1 +
γ(a2B − a2A)
2β(1 + ε)
]R(aA)− C
with R(aA) = p(aA)aA and
πB = N [1 +
γ(a2A − a2B)
2β(1 + ε)
]R(aB)− C
with R(aB) = p(aB)aB.
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II Commercials and IPP:
 Assume broadcaster A has fewer advertisements:
If A has the lower overall advertising level, all type-1 viewers will choose A.
Further, those viewers of type 2 for whom
(1− λ)β < 1
2
γ[(a2B − a2A) + (z2B − z2A)]
⇔ 1− λ <
γ[(a2B + z
2
B)− (a2A + z2A)]
2β
will choose A, too. The fraction of the N type-2 viewers that broadcaster A
gains can be calculated by dividing the right hand side of the above expression
through the length of the interval of λ, which is 1 + ε. Therefore, that fraction is:
γ[(a2B + z
2
B)− (a2A + z2A)]
2β(1 + ε)
 Assume broadcaster A has more advertisements:
If A has more advertising, then its program is watched by all type-1 viewers
except those for whom (note that the right hand side is negative in this case)
(1− λ)β < 1
2
γ[(a2B + z
2
B)− (a2A + z2A)]
⇔ 1− λ <
γ[(a2B + z
2
B)− (a2A + z2A)]
2β
The fraction of the N type-1 viewers that broadcaster A loses can be calculated
by dividing the right hand side of the above expression through the length of the
interval of λ, which is 1 + ε. Therefore, that fraction is:
γ[(a2B + z
2
B)− (a2A + z2A)]
2β(1 + ε)
 Assume broadcasters have the same advertising levels:
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All type-1 viewers for whom
β >
1
2
γ(a2A + z
2
A)
will watch A and all type-2 viewers for whom
β >
1
2
γ(a2B + z
2
B)
will watch B. All viewers who do not watch their preferred program switch off
because of excessive advertising.
We can use the information from above to determine the broadcasters’ profit
functions, i.e.,
π◦A = N
[
1 +
γ[(a2B + z
2
B)− (a2A + z2A)]
2β(1 + ε)
]
[R◦(aA) + R(zA)]− C
with R◦(aA) = p◦(aA)aA, R(zA) = q(zA)zA and
π◦B = N
[
1 +
γ[(a2A + z
2
A)− (a2B + z2B)]
2β(1 + ε)
]
[R◦(aB) + R(zB)]− C
with R◦(aB) = p◦(aB)aB, R(zB) = q(zB)zB. Note that the profit functions
necessarily include both types of revenues, R◦(aB) and R(zB), because broadcast-
ers’ sell the same amount of a and z.
